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ABSTRACT
We present a prediction model to forecast corporate defaults. In a theoretical model, under in-
complete information in a market with publicly traded equity, we show that our approach must
outperform ratings, Altman’s Z-score, and Merton’s distance to default. We reconcile the statisti-
cal and structural approaches under a common framework, i.e., our approach nests Altman’s and
Merton’s approaches as special cases. Empirically, we cannot reject the superiority of our approach.
Furthermore, the numbers of observed defaults align well with the estimated probabilities. Finally,
with rank transforms, we obtain cycle-adjusted forecasts that still outperform ratings.
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Not only has the role of rating agencies in financial markets been criticized, but also the regulators’
policies concerning these agencies. In response to the recent financial crisis, politicians have aimd
at weaning the financial industry from its dependence on ratings, and have therefore searched for
more transparent alternatives. The Dodd–Frank act mandates that all financial agencies scan their
regulations for references to credit ratings, and then remove and replace them with an appropriate
alternative. But what alternatives do we have? We will give a theoretical answer for corporate
ratings and support our theoretical arguments with an empirical application.
In the structural model of Merton (1974), Fischer, Heinkel, and Zechner (1989), or Leland (1994),
the distance to default is a sufficient statistic for the prediction of a firm’s default. The market-
based distance to default is the number of standard deviations a firm is away from default and
any additional data like ratings, financial ratios, asset prices, or macroeconomic variables can-
not improve the forecasting power and is therefore marginally redundant. The empirical results
of Duffie, Saita, and Wang (2007), Bharath and Shumway (2008), Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi
(2008), or Duffie, Eckner, Horel, and Saita (2009) indeed show the significant dependence of defaults
on a firm’s distance to default, but to a lesser extent also to further variables such as the firm’s trail-
ing stock return. However, using purely empirical arguments for favoring a particular forecasting
model may not be satisfactory given the obvious features of default data like scarceness, dependen-
cies, and sample selection biases. Duffie and Lando (2001) argue that in a market in which equity
is not publicly traded, the distance to default cannot be accurately measured, and other covariates
reveal marginal information about the firm’s creditworthiness. For firms with publicly traded equity,
however, Moody’s KMV still entertains a commercial version of the Merton (1974) model in which
the distance to default is the sole explanatory variable. There are no structural models available
yet indicating why Moody’s KMV-approach should not yield the most powerful default forecasts for
firms with publicly traded equity, and therefore why it could not be regarded as an alternative to
ratings.
In a world in which asset values are not perfectly observable, but equity may be traded in
public capital markets, we demonstrate within a 1-period structural probit setup that an augmented
model that combines Merton’s market-based distance to default measure with the reduced-form
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statistical approach initiated by Altman (1968) must lead to default forecasts that are more powerful
than the stand-alone approaches. Since rating agencies group borrowers into bins and since they
neglect the information provided by the current state of the economy (a so-called through-the-
cycle approach), their forecasts must be suboptimal as well. We will show, both theoretically and
empirically, that over a fixed forecast horizon, the structural approach of Merton (1974), the reduced-
form statistical approach of Altman (1968), Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan (1977) as well as
the expert approach applied by rating agencies lead to suboptimal default predictions in terms of
discriminatory power.1
Discrimination, however, is just a relative measure to assess the performance of default forecasts.
Calibration, on the other hand, addresses the absolute dimension of the default risk. Rating agencies
explicitly state that they do not provide absolute measures of default risk. Instead, they provide a
relative ranking of default risks from low to high.2 Ranked data or ordinal measurements describe
the order of the data. By definition, intervals and ratios between different ranks have no meaning.
Consequently, ratings cannot provide answers to questions such as: How likely is an A rated borrower
to default? How much more likely does a BB+ rated issuer default than a BBB- rated borrower
does? For managing credit risk, such questions are naturally of pivotal importance.
To answer these questions, we need absolute measures in the form of estimated default prob-
abilities. For instance, to map a distance to default into a probability of default (PD), we need
the explicit distribution of asset returns. If we assume Gaussian distributed asset returns but
true asset returns are fat-tailed, e.g., in the form of a Student’s t-distribution, then we under-
estimate the true PDs of low risk firms. In other fields—such as weather forecasting or med-
ical prognosis—the statistical comparison of estimated probabilities (e.g., precipitation probabil-
ities, medical recovery probabilities) with realized frequencies is very well established (see e.g.,
Hosmer, Hosmer, le Cessie, and Lemeshow (1997)).3 We can browse through academic papers on de-
fault prediction such as Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004), Duffie, Saita, and Wang (2007),
Bharath and Shumway (2008), Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008), Hilscher and Wilson (2012),
or Duan, Sun, and Wang (2012), and see that goodness-of-fit is not addressed. In particular, if we
make strong distributional or parametric assumptions, we may end up with a mathematically neat,
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elegant model, but with a lack of fit especially for the lowest or highest risk quintals, yet without
adversely affecting its discriminatory power. That is, a model might perform well relatively but not
absolutely.
The latest generation of default prediction models, as initiated by Duffie, Saita, and Wang (2007),
is based on duration analysis, in which one models Poisson default intensities with stochastic covari-
ates, and then one integrates over various forecast horizons to obtain the term structures of the
default probabilities. However, to arrive at such term structures, one needs to impose quite strong
assumptions on the time-series process of the covariates.4 We will show that distributional assump-
tions that are too restrictive can lead to a lack of fit or a miscalibration. Instead, by fixing a forecast
horizon and then resorting to a probit analysis, we will gain the flexibility to apply non-parametric
statistical elements to arrive at powerful and calibrated forecasts without the need to specify the
process of the covariates. We will demonstrate in particular that the non-parametric rank transfor-
mation is a powerful and useful statistical tool both to obtain calibrated default forecasts and to
filter out the influence of the current economic state.
A calibrated model combines two important and testable properties. First, a calibrated model
provides an unbiased estimate for the overall number of defaults. A portfolio of 1,000 borrowers
with a mean default probability of 3% experiences on average 30 credit defaults, i.e., the PD interval
between the default-risky portfolio and the default-free asset must be 3%. Second, calibrated forecasts
differentiate correctly between low and high default probabilities. A sub-portfolio with a mean PD
estimate of 4% has on average twice the default rate at the end of the forecasting period as a sub-
portfolio with an average PD estimate of 2%, i.e., the PD ratio between the two sub-portfolios must
be 2 to 1. Importantly, these two properties over different borrowers (cross section) must hold at
each point in time or in every economic state, respectively (longitudinal section).
To the best of our knowledge, it has not been tested so far whether any default prediction model
provides calibrated forecasts such that the interval lengths and the ratios between the PDs are correct
at each point in a business cycle. Default dependencies inevitably bring the challenge of using the
appropriate test statistics. This problem, which is further aggravated by the sparseness of the
default data, led the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2005) to conclude that “statistical
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tests alone will be insufficient to adequately validate an internal rating system.” This obstacle may
be the explanation why most of the current literature does not fully analyze their models in terms
of calibration. We will perform extensive calibration tests on a population of S&P rated borrowers
with publicly traded equity shares with the help of newly developed test statistics by Blo¨chlinger
(2012) and Blo¨chlinger and Leippold (2011).
Using financial statements and market information, we estimate our model with data from 1982
to 1999. Then, we test our model’s out-of-sample forecasting performance in terms of calibration
and discrimination for the period from 2000 to 2010. Our calibration tests show that our forecasts
perform well absolutely in each year, i.e., at each point during the credit cycle, our forecasts are
calibrated. Importantly, the calibration property does not come at the expense of discriminatory
power. Thus, in terms of ranking the creditworthiness of the borrowers from best to worst, our
model outperforms several benchmarks: Standard & Poor’s corporate issuer ratings, the ζ-score
of Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan (1977), the Z-score of Altman (1968), and the distance to
default model as discussed in Vassalou and Xing (2004). We provide a through-the-cycle version of
our model to filter out macroeconomic effects and we base our default forecasts on this version only
on relative rankings. Our cyclically adjusted version provides a new way to derive PDs since we
resort to a comparative sample at each point in time. Our cycle-adjusted model is calibrated as well,
and is at least as powerful as ratings.
Overall, we will show that we can make calibrated and powerful default forecasts that can be
deemed as appropriate alternatives to corporate credit ratings. Unlike ratings, our forecasts fulfill
some of the minimal requirements stated by the regulator in that our model is transparent, easily
replicable, it only feeds on publicly available data, and it is no black-box. Last but not least, our
adjusted model is by construction non-cyclical and since this model version is also calibrated, it can
be used as input for the calculation of regulatory capital requirements.5
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In Section I we discuss the concept of discrimination
and calibration and how rank transformations can be useful to obtain both powerful, calibrated
forecasts and to filter out macroeconomic influences. Section II derives our structural default model in
which neither Merton’s distance to default nor Altman’s Z-score is sufficient, but must be combined.
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Section III describes the data. Section IV presents our in-sample statistical estimation and Section V
the out-of-sample statistical validation. Section VI concludes.
I. Powerful and Calibrated Forecasts with Rank Transforms
We assume that we are in a 1-period economy with the probability triple (Ω,F ,P) and we want
to make a forecast for the binary default variable Y ∈ {0, 1} whose realization is not known before
the end of the period. The default forecast P to predict the future outcome Y is based on today’s
publicly available information set G ⊆ F , i.e., P is G-measurable and Y is F-measurable.
A. Discriminatory Power
To measure the discriminatory power of a predictor P , we resort to the Lorenz (1905) curve:
Definition 1 (Lorenz Curve): The Lorenz curve of the predictor P is the two-dimensional graph
(P {P ≤ p} ,P {P ≤ p|Y = 1}) (1)
over all p ∈ (−∞,+∞).
On the y-axis we have the fraction of defaulters among a given fraction of the population on the
x-axis. If P and Y are stochastically independent, i.e., P {P ≤ p|Y = 1} = P {P ≤ p}, then P is
a naive predictor. The naive model has no discrimination ability at all, the Lorenz curve therefore
corresponds to the 45 degree line, i.e., in this case we expect to observe x% of all defaulters among
the x% best rated firms. The Lorenz curve of the predictor that knows ex-ante whether a firm fails,
stays at zero up to the point where the x-coordinate equals the fraction of non-defaulting firms and
then directly goes to the point (1, 1). The closer a model’s Lorenz curve is to this hypothetical curve,
the better is its discriminatory power. The area above the Lorenz curve will serve as our summary
statistic of the predictor’s discrimination ability.
We assume that public information G is generated by the firm’s asset value V , the nominal amount
of debt F , and further variables as summarized in the vector X, i.e., G = σ(V, F,X). Inter alia, the
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vector X contains the full information needed to compute the Z-score variables of Altman (1968)
and the ζ-score variables of Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan (1977), but we assume that X and
F do not contain the information needed to compute V . We will also work with the variable V ∗
which is the firm’s asset value investors would be willing to pay at the beginning of the period if the
firm’s manager made public their private information. This is an extension to the case of incomplete
information in the spirit of Duffie and Lando (2001). Under incomplete information, the variable V ∗
cannot be recovered by public information. Formally, we say V ∗ is not σ(X,V, F )-measurable.
In the structural model of Merton (1974), there is no marginal private information, i.e., V ∗ = V ,
and the firm defaults on its debt when the asset value at the end of the period, i.e., V ∗ exp(r), cannot
cover the nominal amount of debt F , where r is the logarithmic asset return. Naturally, the asset
return r is not known before the end of the period and is assumed to be Gaussian distributed with
variance σ2 and mean µ − 0.5σ2. Merton’s distance to default measure DD is then by definition
given by (see, e.g., Bharath and Shumway (2008), Eq. (6) with T=1 period):
DD =
log V − log F + µ− 0.5σ2
σ
, (2)
and since r is Gaussian by assumption, the conditional default probability is
P {Y = 1|X,V, F} = P {V ∗ exp(r) < F |X,V, F} = Φ(−DD) = P {Y = 1|DD} , (3)
where Φ (·) is the cumulative distribution function of a standardized Gaussian variable. The first
equality follows from applying the definition of default, since we have Y = 1{V ∗ exp(r)<F}, where
1{·} is the indicator function. The last equality expresses the sufficiency of DD, i.e., the conditional
probability is only a function of DD. The marginal information provided by the full information set
X, V , F is marginally irrelevant in making default forecasts: the single variable DD is sufficient.
In Merton’s model, Φ (−DD) is the most powerful model among all predictors which are generated
by public information. This result is a consequence of the sufficiency in (3) and the following lemma.
Lemma 1: The conditional probability P {Y = 1| G} is the most powerful predictor among all predic-
tors generated by the information set G, i.e., the Lorenz curve of any other G-measurable predictor
must lie above the Lorenz curve of the conditional probability P {Y = 1| G}.
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The proof of Lemma 1 and the proofs of all the following propositions can be found in Appendix
A. Conditional probabilities based on smaller information sets, e.g., P {Y = 1|X}, or P {Y = 1},
must be less powerful than Φ (−DD). Hence, the Z-score of Altman (1968) or the ζ-score of
Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan (1977) must have lower discrimination ability if the assump-
tions of Merton (1974) hold true (since DD cannot be computed from X and F ). Note, Y would
be even more powerful than Φ (−DD), but Y is not known/measurable as of today. By definition
of the Lorenz curve in (1), any strictly monotone transformation of a predictor must have the same
discrimination ability as the original predictor, so that Φ (−DD) and −DD produce exactly the
same Lorenz curve.
B. Calibration
Calibration is a completely different concept from discrimination:
Definition 2 (Calibrated Forecasts): The predictor P is calibrated if P {Y = 1|P} = P .
Therefore, if the Gaussian assumption of Merton (1974) indeed holds true, the predictor Φ (−DD)
is not only the must powerful predictor among all predictors that use publicly available data, but is
calibrated as well. However, if asset returns are non-Gaussian, then Φ (−DD) is still the must power-
ful predictor but no longer calibrated. In particular, if r is fat-tailed, we may underestimate the true
default probabilities for low risks if we nonetheless apply Φ (−DD). The naive predictor P {Y = 1}
on the other hand is calibrated but not as powerful as the miscalibrated predictor Φ (−DD). This
example highlights the difference between calibration and discrimination. A predictor can be cal-
ibrated but be less powerful than a miscalibrated predictor and vice versa. Naturally, it is highly
desirable to make forecasts with a predictor that is both calibrated and powerful.
We will show in the next section that Φ (−DD) is neither calibrated nor powerful even under
Gaussian assumptions when asset values are not perfectly observable. That is, augmenting DD with
accounting data such as those entering the ζ-score of Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan (1977)
improves the default forecast beyond the information provided by DD. In a non-Gaussian world we
will even need additional transformations to obtain calibrated forecasts.
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C. Rank Transformation
Rank transformations are used to transform data that do not meet the assumptions of normality.
This non-parametric statistical procedure has been recommended as being robust to non-normal
errors, resistant to outliers, and efficient for many distributions, as concluded by Conover and Iman
(1981). Rank transformations have already proved to be useful in financial ratio analyses and logistic
regressions, as reported by Kane and Meade (1998) and Kane, Richardson, and Meade (1998). In
the context of default prediction, we will demonstrate that rank transformations offer an elegant
way to perform calibrated predictions based only on relative rankings, which makes these forecasts
directly comparable to ratings that are by definition only relative risk assessments. Overall, rank
transformations allow us to filter out macroeconomic effects in a non-parametric way and we further
expect the rank transformation to improve both the calibration and discrimination.
To rank-transform a particular variable X, we resort to a set of observations or a compara-
tive sample,
{
X(1), ...,X(N)
}
, respectively. We then define the rank transformation function of the
variable X in analogy to an empirical cumulative distribution function (cdf):
RX(x) =
1
N
N∑
j=1
1{X(j)≤x}, for any x ∈ (−∞,∞),
where we normalize by the size of the observation sample N so that RX(·) : R → [0, 1]. The rank
transform dampens dramatically the influence of outliers, since the rank transformation function is
by definition bounded above by 1 and below by 0. We will use two different comparative samples
to perform rank transformations. The first sample includes past observations over a whole business
cycle (=panel data), the second sample includes only current observations (=cross-sectional data). To
simplify notation, we denote the first transformation by RX(·) and the second one by rt,X(·). Hence,
a value of RX(x) = 0.2 means that we can expect to observe 20% of all observations of X over a
business cycle to be less than or equal to x (=long term ranking). A value of rt,X(x) = 0.2 means that
at time t, 20% of the observations have the same or lower values than x (=current ranking at time
t). In a downturn, the distance to default DD can be low relative to past observations (=long term
ranking), but relatively high if we compare it just to the current set of issuers (=current ranking).
[Figure 1 about here]
8
Figure 1 illustrates both the long-term and the current rankings of DD for January 2009 and
2011. The current ranking or, equivalently, the empirical complementary cumulative distribution
function (cdf) as of January 2011 dominates the complementary cdf as of January 2009. Hence,
in the midst of the financial market crisis, the empirical p-quantile of DD was smaller than at the
beginning of 2011 for any p ∈ (0, 1). To give an example, as of January 2009, a borrower with a
distance to default DD of 4.0 was clearly above the median value of 1.2 but neither over the long
term with a median of 5.0 nor as of January 2011 with a median of 6.8.
[Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2 illustrates the rank and power transformations of four accounting variables used by
Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan (1977). In Panel B of Figure 2, we see the transformation for
the ζ-variable “cumulative probability.” If a corporation has no retained earnings, then the rank-
transformed cumulative profitability variable has a value of 22.4%. Over a business cycle, 77.6%
of firms are expected to have a retained earnings to total assets ratio of more than zero. Figure 2
illustrates the transformation of three further ζ-variables.
To make powerful and calibrated forecasts, we will apply rank and power transformations to
obtain a credit score S and then use the Gaussian link function Φ(−S) to obtain an estimated default
probability. The variable S can then be nicely interpreted as the number of standard deviations a
borrower is away from default. Therefore, S is similar in spirit to the distance to default measure
DD in Merton’s model. The generic version of our augmented model takes the form
PD = Φ(κ0 + κ1RDD(DD) + κ2RDD(DD)
p + κ3
7∑
j=1
ηjRj(ζj)
q)
= Φ(−S), S = −κ0 − κ1RDD(DD)− κ2RDD(DD)
p − κ3
∑7
j=1 ηjRj(ζj)
q. (4)
The parameters p and q as well as κ0, κ1, κ2, κ3, and ηj, j = 1, . . . , 7, are to be estimated from the
data.6 The variable RDD(DD) is the rank-transformed distance to default variable, and Rj(ζj) the
rank-transformed accounting variable ζj.
Rating agencies claim that they take into consideration only relative risks. Therefore, the infor-
mation set generated by ratings alone allows no inference about the state of the economy. As a direct
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consequence, if we are restricted to the information set provided by rating agencies, the conditional
default probability for a given rating class must be the same in a downturn as well as in an upturn.
A powerful model, however, must at least implicitly also consider the state of the economy.
To filter out the state of the economy from our general model in (4) and to make a fair comparison
with agency ratings, we will perform additional forecasts based only on the relative rankings of S in
(4). Thus, we consider only the current ranking rt,S , and make no comparisons to past observations
or different economic states. The current median value of S within the comparative sample can be
higher or lower than last year’s or even yesterday’s median. We then make forecasts on this restricted
information set as follows:
PD = Φ(c0 + c1 rt,S(S) + c2 rt,S(S)
v)
= Φ(−S¯), S¯ = −c0 − c1 rt,S(S)− c2 rt,S(S)
v . (5)
Note, we estimate here the conditional default probability P {Y = 1| G} in Lemma 1 when the infor-
mation set G consists only of relative rankings. The input is ordinal data, the outcome is an absolute
measure. This novel approach to derive PDs needs the current, comparative sample at each point in
time. Therefore, if a borrower is, say, in the 11th percentile, i.e., rt,S(S) = 0.11 in an upturn as well
as in a downturn, then the issuer will have the same conditional default probability in (5) in both
economic states even though that the conditional default probability in (4) can be lower in an upturn
as compared to a downturn. The same is true for a borrower in, say, the 56th percentile, so that the
PD ratio between borrowers in the xth percentile and issuers in the yth percentile is constant over
time for any x, y ∈ (0, 1). Hence, both the PD levels and the PD ratios in (5) will remain unchanged
over the business cycle. In the words of Blo¨chlinger and Leippold (2011), the PD function in (5),
unlike the PD function in (4), has the same level calibration and the same shape calibration at each
point in time. Again, S¯ can be nicely interpreted as the number of standard deviations a borrower
is away from default when we abstract from the current state of the economy.
The time series of many financial figures have no unit root, and in particular, the distance to
default measure DD can be assumed to be mean reverting. This observation was characterized by
Duffie, Saita, and Wang (2007) as “leverage targeting, by which corporations pay out dividends and
other forms of distributions when they achieve a sufficiently low degree of leverage, and conversely
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attempt to raise capital and retain earnings to a higher degree when their leverage introduces financial
distress or business inflexibility.” In a good state of the economy, the median borrower’s DD is higher
than the long-term median, the median default probability is also lower, and firms can make larger
dividend payments to their shareholders, which causes reductions of the distances to default and
thereby increases the default probabilities again. The current ranking rt,DD, unlike the long-term
ranking RDD, filters out these swings over the business cycle, so that the median of rt,DD is 0.5
at each point of time t. That is why we call the conditional PD in (4) our point-in-time, or, more
simply, the PIT model, and the conditional PD based on relative rankings in (5) will be called the
through-the-cycle, or, for short, the TTC model.
By Lemma 1, the discriminatory power of our TTC predictor on the restricted information set
in (5) must be less powerful than the PIT predictor that can resort to the larger information set
in (4). It is a well-known statistical property that the conditional expectation on a information set
G has greater variance than the conditional mean on a subset of G. The forecasts of model PIT
are therefore expected to be more powerful but more volatile or less stable than the predictions
from TTC. We will show in the following empirical analysis that even when we are limited to the
information set of the current rankings of S, our TTC forecasts are still at least as powerful as
ratings. But first we show, in a structural model, that augmenting the distance to default measure
with additional data improves the prediction accuracy.
II. Reconciling Merton’s and Altman’s Approaches
Augmenting Merton’s distance to default model with additional variables may seem an ad-hoc
fix for incomplete information. Empirically, Bharath and Shumway (2008) already show that the
Merton model does not produce a sufficient statistic for the probability of default. However, we can
put the augmentation on a sound theoretical basis.
Since we are interested in making default predictions over a fixed forecast horizon, we consider
a 1-period structural default model. We borrow the idea of Duffie and Lando (2001) that a firm’s
asset value is only observable with noise. Duffie and Lando (2001) derive the term structure of credit
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spreads when equity is not traded in public markets. In our model, both equity and debt may or
may not be traded in public financial markets. Thus, our population explicitly includes firms with
publicly traded equity. Our focus is on the probability that a firm is incapable of repaying its debt
at the end of the forecast horizon.
In our structural model, we assume that the variable V ∗ corresponds to the price that market
participants would be willing to pay today for the firm’s assets when the firm’s managers publish their
private information. Both debt and equity holders have no access to managers’ private information
and must estimate today’s asset value V ∗ based on publicly available information. Managers are
precluded by insider-trading regulation from trading in public capital markets. Managers cannot
be selective as to how they release information. This means that equity holders cannot have more
information than debt holders. All market participants receive managerial information at the same
time. Managers will initiate the liquidation of the firm if the end of period asset value, V ∗ exp(r),
fails to meet the debt payment F , i.e., Y = 1{V ∗ exp(r)<F} denotes the default indicator, r is the
logarithmic asset return.
Assumption 1: The market participants’ estimate of today’s asset value V ∗ using only public infor-
mation is
log V = log V ∗ + U,
where V is the market’s estimate and U is the estimation error. The estimate V for the asset value
V ∗ is unbiased.
We further assume that the mean asset return and the mean asset value are a function of the
vector X, which may contain figures such as the risk-free rate, book-to-market ratio, turnover, market
capitalization, book value of equity, current ratio, industry indicators, state of the economy, GDP,
or Fama–French factors. For instance, the mean asset return can be the risk free return rf plus a
premium for factor risk. Thus, we make the following distributional assumptions:
Assumption 2: The logarithmic nominal amount of debt logF , the vector X, as well as log V ∗, r, and
U follow a multivariate Gaussian distribution. The three variables V ∗, r, and U , given the variables
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X and F , are supposed to be mutually independent:

log V ∗
r
U

 ∼ N




γ⊤X
λ⊤X − σ2/2
−α2/2

 ,


δ2 0 0
0 σ2 0
0 0 α2



 , (6)
whereas δ, σ, α > 0.
Given joint normality, the independence assumption in (6) is without loss of generality. Under
the above assumptions, we can derive the following proposition:
Proposition 1: Given Assumptions 1 and 2 and conditional on the public information generated by
F , V , and X, the default probability P{Y = 1|F, V,X} is given by
PD = Φ
(
β0 + β1 log F + β
⊤
2 X + βDDDD
)
= Φ(Z + βDDDD) , DD =
log
(
V
F
)
+ µ− 12σ
2
σ
, (7)
where µ = λ⊤X as well as
β1 =
1√
σ2 + δ2 − δ
4
δ2+α2
α2
δ2 + α2
, β0 =
1
2
(σ2 − δ2)β1, β2 = −β1 (λ+ γ) , βDD = −σ
δ2
α2
β1,
and Z := β0+β1 log F +β
⊤
2 X. Conditional on public and private information, the default probability
P{Y = 1|F, V,X, V ∗} is given by
PD∗ = Φ(−DD∗) , with DD∗ =
log
(
V ∗
F
)
+ µ− 12σ
2
σ
. (8)
Hence, under the inclusion of private information, the distance to default measure DD∗ is again
sufficient. However, given only public information, the distance to default DD is no longer sufficient
even though we have used an unbiased estimate for V ∗ in the form of V to compute DD. That is, the
default probability in (7) is represented as a function of both Merton’s distance to default measure
DD and a score component Z, similar in spirit to Altman’s Z-score. We can show that only under
specific assumptions is one of these two approaches sufficient to build a default forecast. We first
consider the case when the asset value V ∗ can be perfectly observed, i.e., when we let α→ 0. Then
we have β0 = β1 = β2 = 0, βDD = −1, and the PD reduces to Merton’s original PD:
PD = Φ (−DD) . (9)
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Hence, the Z-score component becomes totally irrelevant in predicting defaults in the case of complete
information. Second, if the estimated asset value V is extremely noisy, α→∞, then βDD → 0 and
we have a PD that is only a function of the Z-score:
PD = Φ
(
β0 + β1 logF + β
⊤
2 X
)
= Φ(Z) , (10)
with β1 =
(
σ2 + δ2
)−0.5
and β0, β2 as given in Proposition 1. Importantly, the distance to default
measure drops out in this case.
Given Assumption 2, the variables log V , log F , and X are multivariate Gaussian. Hence, Z and
DD follow a bivariate Gaussian distribution due to the linear transformation,
Z ∼ N(µZ , σ
2
Z), DD ∼ N(µDD, σ
2
DD),
with correlation coefficient ρ. If the asset values can be perfectly observed (α → 0), then Z is
degenerate and equal to 0 with µZ = 0 and σZ = 0. In Proposition 1, we have the default probability
conditional on the situation when both Z and DD are known. In the proposition below, we derive
the default probabilities for the case when both Z and DD are unknown or when only one of these
variables is known.
Proposition 2: Given Assumptions 1 and 2 and conditional on knowing only the measure DD, Mer-
ton’s adjusted probability of default is given by
P {Y = 1|DD} = Φ

µZ − ρ σZσDDµDD +DD
(
βDD + ρ
σZ
σDD
)
√
1 + σ2Z (1− ρ
2)

 = Φ(b0 + bDDDD) , (11)
where
b0 =
µZ − ρ
σZ
σDD
µDD√
1 + σ2Z (1− ρ
2)
, and bDD =
βDD + ρ
σZ
σDD√
1 + σ2Z (1− ρ
2)
.
Similarly, conditional on knowing only Z, Altman’s probability of default is given by
P {Y = 1|Z} = Φ

βDDµDD − ρβDD σDDσZ µZ + Z
(
1 + ρβDD
σDD
σZ
)
√
1 + β2DDσ
2
DD(1− ρ
2)

 . (12)
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If no source of information at all is available, we can only apply the naive probability of default:
P {Y = 1} = Φ

 µZ + βDD µDD√
1 + σ2Z + β
2
DDσ
2
DD + 2ρβDDσDDσZ

 , (13)
which cannot discriminate between low and high risks.
By construction, the predictor Φ (−DD∗) based on public and private information in (8), our
augmented PD, Φ (Z + βDDDD), based solely on public information in (7), Merton’s adjusted PD
in (11), Altman’s PD in (12), as well as the naive PD in (13), are all calibrated, since they satisfy
Definition 2. The Lorenz curves for these five predictors as defined in (1), however, will in general
look different. According to Lemma 1, Φ (Z + βDDDD) in (7) is more powerful than Merton’s PD
and Altman’s PD, as well as the naive PD. On the other hand, Φ (−DD∗) in (8) can discriminate
even better than Φ (Z + βDDDD).
These differing discrimination abilities can be explained intuitively as follows: Merton’s PD
neglects the information provided by Z. If two observations have the same distance to default
measure DD, Merton ranks them as equally likely to default even though they have different default
probabilities due to different values of Z. Hence, among the group of observations with the same
distance to default DD, we could still make a refinement of the ranking by exploiting the information
in Z. Hence, our augmented PD in (7) necessarily outperforms Merton’s PD in (11) in terms of
discriminatory power.
Merton’s adjusted PD, Φ (b0 + bDDDD) in (11), is a monotone transformation of Merton’s orig-
inal PD, Φ (−DD) in (9). Hence, both predictors provide the same relative ranking. In terms of
discriminatory power both work equally well and produce exactly the same Lorenz curve. However, if
asset values are not perfectly observable, then Φ (−DD) unlike Φ (b0 + bDDDD) is not calibrated and
some risks are underestimated while other risks are overestimated. Indeed, a clear pattern emerges.
Proposition 3: If asset values are not perfectly observable, i.e., α > 0, then Merton’s original PD,
Φ (−DD), underestimates low default risks and overestimates high default risks.
Proposition 3 states that if we wrongly assume asset values to be perfectly observable, we will
necessarily observe more defaults than predicted for low-risk issuers (with a distance to default above
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a critical value) and the mean default rate will be lower than forecast for high-risk issuers. Hence,
whenever asset values are not perfectly observable, we must first apply a linear transformation to
DD to obtain calibrated forecasts.
Our default probability in (7) is a continuous function of Z and DD. Any grouping of forecasts
into discrete classes, as is done by rating agencies such as S&P, must result in an inferior ranking.
Issuers with different default probabilities end up in the same rating class. Therefore, if we group
observations into discrete rating classes, we lose discriminatory power. We can no longer distinguish
between low and high risks within a given rating class. This loss of power due to discretization seems
to be quite acute between S&P’s BBB- and BB+ as the observed 1-year default frequency for the
former group is 0.06% and 0.36% for the latter, as plotted in Panel B of Figure 3. A PD ratio of six
to one for two neighboring rating notches is quite sizeable.
Furthermore, rating agencies admittedly disregard the state of the economy. They neglect part
of the information provided by X. Therefore, ratings can no longer be as powerful as the augmented
predictor in (7), unless they can incorporate private information to make up for this shortcoming.
However, insider trading regulation implies that rating analysts cannot be privy to the managers’
private information ahead of the general public.
From our Gaussian assumptions, the end of period log asset value, log V ∗ + r, given public
information, is again Gaussian. As a consequence, the optimal predictor in the form of the conditional
default probability in (7) is the mapping of a linear function of Z and DD via the Gaussian link
function Φ(·). Such a specification corresponds to a probit setup and the model parameters can
be estimated by maximizing the likelihood function. The best performing model can be selected
by likelihood ratio tests. However, under non-normality, the functional form of the conditional
probability will look different. We will see in the following empirical analysis that we can construct
better fitting models by foregoing the distributional restrictions imposed by Assumption 2.
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III. The Dataset
Our population includes all non-financial corporations rated by S&P between 1982 and October
2011 that have publicly traded equity shares.7 We are not aware of any reason why our findings
for S&P should not equally apply to the populations rated by Moody’s or Fitch. Financial ratios,
equity, and debt data was retrieved from Bloomberg, and we divided our data into an estimation
sample and a validation sample. The estimation sample ranges from 1982 to 1999 and serves to
select the relevant predictor variables and to estimate the parameters of the forecasting models. The
validation sample ranges from 2000 to 2011 and allows us to test the forecasting performance of
different models and to benchmark them against S&P ratings. Our objective is to forecast whether
a firm defaults within one year. Our S&P data ends in October 2011, hence the last date for which
we know whether a given firm has defaulted within one year is October 2010.
To avoid overlapping time windows, we select the data at one particular month of a year, i.e.,
we include S&P ratings, accounting data, and distance to default measures by the end of October
for every firm and year. Publicly held corporations in the US are required to report earnings to the
SEC within 45 days of the end of their first three fiscal quarters. However, most firms release their
results much earlier through press releases. Thus, the end of October is a time when the so-called
earnings season is virtually over and the bulk of companies has released their third quarter earnings
reports.8
At the end of each October and for each firm, we observe the predictor variables and whether
S&P downgraded the firm to D (“in default”) one year later. Since the distance to default is market-
based, it changes every day. In contrast, most of the variables of the Z-score and ζ-score are based on
balance sheet data, which are available, at most, quarterly. For balance sheet data, we use the latest
available report. In total, the estimation sample contains 7,684 firm-years, and the validation sample
contains 16,727 firm-years. We summarize the dataset used for our empirical study in Table I.
[TABLE I about here]
Moody’s KMV uses a proprietary version of the Merton (1974) distance to default model. The
reconstruction of the distance to default measure with publicly available data can be found in Ap-
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pendix B. Fink (2003) presents a table with Moody’s KMV estimated PDs and asset volatilities for
95 companies as of August 2000. As a sanity check, Bharath and Shumway (2008) compare their
estimated volatilities and PD estimates of 80 companies with these numbers. The rank correlation
of Spearman (1904) between their estimates and Moody’s KMV is 79% for PDs and 57% for asset
volatilities. The same sanity check is performed with our dataset. In total, there are 78 firms for
which Spearman’s rank correlation between our estimates and Moody’s KMV can be calculated. For
PDs, the rank correlation is 83.4%, and 90.3% for asset volatility estimates. Hence, we can safely
conclude that the distance to default model here is similar to the version of Bharath and Shumway
(2008), demonstrating that we are able to capture much of the information in Moody’s KMV’s
estimates.
IV. In-Sample Estimation
For our empirical analysis, we estimate the models introduced above under different specifications
by maximizing the likelihood function. Then we look at the time series of eight selected companies,
of which one-half have defaulted, to gain a qualitative impression of our PD estimates.
A. Model Estimation and Selection
First, we use Merton’s original PD in (9):
M1 : PD = Φ (−DD) .
Since M1 is a purely structural specification, no parameters need be estimated from the data.
However, we can determine the likelihood value of this specification for comparative statistics as
reported in Table II. We then perform a probit analysis to estimate the parameters b0 and bDD for
Merton’s adjusted PD in (11). We obtain the following PD estimate for this specification:
M2 : PD = Φ (b0 + bDDDD) = Φ (−1.57 − 0.34DD) .
In Table II, the large t-values indicate that the constant b0 becomes significantly different from zero
and that the sensitivity parameter bDD is significantly different from minus one. By comparing
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the likelihoods, we find that model M2 has a significantly better fit than M1. This finding is an
empirical confirmation of Proposition 3, that Merton’s original PD systematically underestimates
low risks and overestimates high risks.
[TABLE II about here]
Since it is well-documented that asset returns are fat-tailed, we expect that rank and power
transformations applied to the distance to default variable DD will improve the goodness of fit.
Hence, we estimate the following model:
M3 : PD = Φ (a0 + a1RDD(DD) + a2RDD(DD)
p)
= Φ(−D), D = 4.49 − 2.64RDD(DD)− 1.63RDD(DD)
30,
where a1, a2, a3, and p are parameters estimated from the data, and RDD(DD) denotes the rank-
transformed distance to default variable. As shown in Table II, the transformation of RDD(DD)
to the power of 30 has a higher likelihood than the transformations to the power of 10 (model
M4) and 50 (model M5). Importantly, M1 to M5 all produce the same Lorenz (1905) curve, as
they are simply a monotone transformation of the distance to default measure into a 1-year default
probability. All perform equally well in terms of discrimination. However, in terms of calibration
or goodness of fit, they differ hugely. Panel A of Figure 3 shows the different mappings of DD into
an estimated default probability for M1, M2, M3. The log likelihood values of these three models
differ significantly with values of -1158.0, -330.3, and -321.3.
In other words, the structural and distributional assumptions of model M1, and M2 as stated in
Section II are clearly rejected. On the one hand, Merton’s complete information assumption in M1
is rejected in favor of incomplete information as reflected by M2. On the other hand, Assumption
2 under multivariate Gaussian variables is definitely too restrictive and does not provide well fitting
models or calibrated forecasts, since M3 statistically outperforms M2. In summary, M1 and M2
suffer from a lack of fit, both models are therefore miscalibrated and rejected in favor of M3. Panel
B of Figure 3 shows the mapping of S&P rating classes into default probabilities estimated by simple
count statistics, i.e., the number of defaulters at the end of the observation period divided by the
number of observations at the beginning for each rating class
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[Figure 3 about here]
Table III shows the results from the estimation of probit models for the Z-score and the ζ-score
variables. Since these models are not nested, we cannot resort to the likelihood ratio to select the
best performing model. Instead, we base our selection on the information criterion of Akaike (1974).
The model with the ζ-score variables statistically outperforms the model with the Z-score data. To
limit the influence of outliers, we apply again the rank transformation to the original financial ratios.
With our rank-transformed variables, we obtain higher likelihoods than by simply Winsorizing the
variables, as previously suggested by Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008). Some ζ-variables are
statistically insignificant. Therefore, we exclude these variables from the subsequent analysis and we
only use debt service (ζ3), cumulative profitability (ζ4), capitalization (ζ6), and company size relative
to median value (ζ7). Besides the rank transformation, an additional square root transformation
provides an even better fit of the data. Note that instead of using the original size variable in dollars,
as suggested by Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan (1977), we divide it by the current median asset
value of the underlying population of borrowers. Otherwise, the size variable would have a unit.
[TABLE III about here]
Among all accounting-based prediction models in Table III, we select the specification given by
A1 : PD = Φ(η0 +
7∑
j=1
ηjRj(ζj)
q)
= Φ (−Z) , Z = −0.22 + 0.99
√
R3(ζ3) + 0.67
√
R4(ζ4) + 1.88
√
R6(ζ6) + 1.31
√
R7(ζ7),
where Z is a credit score in analogy to Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan (1977), and R3(ζ3),
R4(ζ4), R6(ζ6), and R7(ζ7) are the rank-transformed variables, Z describes the number of standard
deviations a firm is away from default when only the variables of Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan
(1977) are used as the information set. Since the financial ratios are definitely non-Gaussian, it was
to be expected that models with rank-transformed financial ratios would outperform those where
the ratios are simply Winsorized. Therefore, A1 represents the non-Gaussian empirical equivalent
of the conditional probability derived in (12).
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As shown in Table II, Merton’s distance to default model, M3, has a significantly higher like-
lihood value than Altman’s ζ-score model, A1, which has two more parameters, -321.3 vs. -351.2.
Therefore M3 is statistically superior to A1. In fact, by examining the likelihoods and the number
of parameters, we find that all distance to default models in Table II, except Merton’s original model
M1, are statistically superior to A1.
[Figure 4 about here]
From Figure 4, we observe that the ζ-score and the distance to default are positively correlated,
but not perfectly so. Spearman’s rank correlation shows a coefficient of 64.1% in the estimation sam-
ple (Panel A) and 57.1% in the validation sample (Panel B). As expected, the majority of defaulters
are concentrated in the tenth deciles, both in the estimation sample and the validation sample.
Hence, as the correlation is not perfect, there is hope for improvement when both variables are com-
bined into an augmented default risk measure. Therefore, we implement different combinations of
market-based and accounting variables and search for the best model specified by Equation (4). We
call it the point-in-time (PIT) model:9
PIT : PD = Φ(κ0 + κ1RDD(DD) + κ2RDD(DD)
p + κ3
7∑
j=1
ηjRj(ζj)
q)
= Φ (−S) , S = 2.88 − 1.79RDD(DD)− 1.27RDD(DD)
30 + 0.40Z. (14)
Again, by maximum likelihood we obtain parameter estimates for κ0, κ1, κ2, κ3, and p. The variable
S is a standardized credit score. Note, for the aggregated variable Z, we do not re-estimate ηj or
q, but we take the values from model A1 as given. We justify this procedure by considerations of
statistical robustness and parsimony. As the t-value for the ζ-score in Table III suggests, augmenting
the model with Z significantly increases its information content. The likelihood ratios demonstrate
that the model PIT (log likelihood of -311.7) is statistically superior to the best performing distance
to default model M3 (log likelihood of -321.3) and the best performing ζ-score model A1 (log
likelihood of -351.2). This empirical result was expected from Proposition 1, since asset values
cannot be observed but must be estimated, with the consequence that the distance to default cannot
be a sufficient statistic.
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In addition, we also implement our business-cycle adjusted default probability model, which we
call the through-the-cycle (TTC) model:
TTC : PD = Φ(c0 + c1 rt,S(S) + c2 rt,S(S)
v)
= Φ
(
−S¯
)
, S¯ = 3.37 − 0.83 rt,S(S)− 1.99 rt,S(S)
10. (15)
where rt,S(S) ∈ [0, 1] is the current ranking at time t of our point-in-time distance S in Equation
(14). By construction, the mean PD of forecasting model TTC is constant over time and since
TTC is based on a smaller information set, its optimized likelihood value of -332.5 is significantly
lower than PIT. Thus, due to the larger information set, the mean default probability of model
PIT tends to be higher before an expected downturn and lower before an anticipated expansion.
Under the TTC model, the population has the same mean default probability of 1.34%, the same
median PD of 0.16%, and the same minimum (maximum) PD of 0.038% (29.1%) at each point in
time. Hence, the default probability in Equation (15) corrects the default probability obtained in
Equation (14) for business-cycle effects. A conditional PD based on current rankings only allows no
inference on the state of the economy. By filtering out business cycle effects, we obtain conditional
default probabilities that look “through the cycle.”
Merton’s distance to default DD is actually meant to express the number of standard deviations
a firm is away from default. However, we clearly reject this calibration hypothesis since D from
model M3 is the more appropriate distance measure in terms of standard deviations away from
default. The distance measures Z from model A1 is supposed to be calibrated as well, but judging
from Akaike’s information criterion, it seems to be significantly less powerful than D. Furthermore,
based on our estimation results, the PIT score S,
S = 2.88− 1.79RDD(DD)− 1.27RDD(DD)
30 + 0.40Z, (16)
is calibrated and the most powerful distance measure. As a consequence, the TTC score S¯,
S¯ = 3.37 − 0.83 rt,S(S)− 1.99 rt,S(S)
10,
expresses the number of standard deviations away from default in terms of the relative risk corrected
for the state of the economy. Note that, even though our score S¯ is based solely on relative risk
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assessments, we obtain nonetheless a conditional default probability estimate in the form of Φ(−S¯).
Hence, in contrast to the forecasts provided by rating agencies, we obtain calibrated forecasts.
There are different views on whether credit ratings should be point-in-time or through-the-cycle
forecasts. Rating agencies filter out the higher bankruptcy risk during recessions, that is, agency
ratings are through-the-cycle ratings. However, market participants arguably want to anticipate
the increased default risk even if the heightened default intensity is expected to be only transitory
and not permanent. This view is also implicitly supported by the Dodd–Frank Act.10 On the
other hand, there are valid arguments for non-cyclical capital requirements, which must be based on
cycle-adjusted default probabilities. In any case, we now have a point-of-time version, PIT, and a
through-the-cycle version, TTC, of our model.
We remark that we floor the estimated default probabilities at 0.02% in M3, and A1, to further
reduce the effects of outliers. We also floor and cap the PDs of model PIT by maximizing the
likelihood function once more to obtain a floor of 0.031% and a cap of 37% under an optimized
likelihood value of -310.1 (by keeping the other parameters fixed). That is, the in-sample likelihood
values improve only insignificantly by flooring and capping (remember, without cap and floor we
have a likelihood value of -311.7), but we think that very low and very high probability estimates
are more likely to be driven by noise than by signal, so we use the floored and capped PD estimates
in the following. Note that only a small fraction of less than 1% of the estimation sample is affected
by the cap.
S&P ratings are by definition ordinal measures. We employ simple count statistics to map
monotonically the alphabetic rating scale onto a scale between zero and one to make them comparable
to PD estimates as shown in Panel B of Figure 3. In particular, for each rating class, we sum the
number of observations over all months in the estimation sample in the denominator, and we sum
the corresponding number of defaulters one year later in the numerator. This quotient is an estimate
for a “through the cycle default probability” for the corresponding rating class. Given only ratings
data, we have no information on the state of the economy. As a consequence, a borrower with the
same rating in two different states of the economy must have the same conditional PD in both states
unless we were to supplement the ratings with marginal information that is not provided by the rating
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agencies. To have strictly positive values for each rating class and to be strictly monotone across
classes, we assign an estimate by interpolation/extrapolation to the lowest risk classes, whereas the
AAA class is mapped onto a value of 0.001%. This monotone PD mapping allows us to plot time
series of S&P ratings, M3, A1, PIT, and TTC, on a common scale for selected companies.
B. Probability Estimates for Selected Firms
Figure 5 shows the time series of 1-year ahead forecasts for four defaulting firms: Enron, Parmalat,
Delphi, and General Motors. The performance of S&P is mixed at best. They were usually slow in
downgrading a subsequent defaulter. Our observation is consistent with several surveys which show
that market participants believe that rating agencies are slow in responding to changes in credit
quality.11 The agencies usually reply to this critique that their ratings are “through the cycle,” with
the intention of measuring credit quality over long investment horizons. Rating stability, however, is
often in conflict with rating timeliness.
[Figure 5 about here]
From Figure 5 we observe that, in contrast to S&P’s issuer ratings, our default probability
anticipated much more quickly the imminent defaults of Enron, Parmalat, Delphi, and General
Motors. For Enron, S&P did not change the rating until days before the corporation declared
bankruptcy (Panel A). However, one of the reasons why the default probability for Enron based
on the Merton model M3 increased may be due to a falling business cycle and a corresponding
general increase of default likelihoods. Since S&P is, by their own definition, through the cycle, one
may expect that it does not anticipate such economic downturns, but it must anticipate the relative
worsening of Enron’s individual credit standing in comparison to other companies. However, even
our through-the-cycle model TTC picks up the worsening of Enron’s creditworthiness already at the
end of 2000. For Parmalat, the story is similar (Panel B). Parmalat defaulted in December 2003
and was the biggest European default at the time, but the S&P rating for Parmalat at the end of
November 2003 was still unchanged. The S&P record for the defaulting car parts supplier Delphi is
a bit better (Panel C). However, the ζ-score A1 shows a better performance than S&P. The ζ-score
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A1 correctly generates low probabilities of default before the end of 2004 and then increased the
default risk significantly during the last year of Delphi’s life. Compared to Merton’s model M3,
the ζ-score A1 did not produce false default signals during the performing years of Delphi. For
General Motors (Panel D), S&P’s rating correctly anticipated its financial distress. This is reflected
by the fact that they gradually decreased their rating until General Motors’ default. However, our
alternative models also seem to perform well in the case of General Motors.
[Figure 6 about here]
While the focus in Figure 5 is on companies that actually defaulted, we may now want to switch
focus to companies that have not defaulted. In Figure 6, we plot the default forecasts for Fiat,
General Electric, Coca-Cola, and McDonald’s. We observe that Merton’s model M3 may produce
more false alarms than the other forecasting approaches. Especially for General Electric, Coca-Cola,
and McDonald’s, S&P’s ratings and our adjusted default probability based on TTC are more stable
over the business cycle than M3, as seen in Figure 6. Before recessionary periods, the probability
of default based on models M3, A1, and PIT is by construction higher on average than before
expansionary periods of the business cycle. This can be seen most prominently with GE and the
difference between PIT and TTC after 09/11 and after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers in
09/08. Merton’s model M3 produces stronger false alarms in the form of spikes in the case of
General Electric (Panel B) and McDonald’s (Panel D) than our default forecasts from model TTC.
The default probability based on M3 created some significant spikes even though the two companies
never defaulted on their debt. We also observe two spikes in the time series of Merton’s default
probability M3 for Coca-Cola (Panel C). The S&P rating of Coca-Cola, however, remained constant.
On the other hand, S&P was rather slow in adjusting the rating of Fiat (Panel A). With Fiat, the
track record of S&P is rather dismal. In 2007, the default probability based on TTC for Fiat was at
a historic low. Merton’s M3 default probability measures almost no default risk. S&P followed with
some delay in 2008, but it is during that time that the credit outlook of Fiat deteriorated significantly
due to the financial market crisis and the anticipated recessionary period. As a consequence, S&P
reversed its erstwhile credit upgrade at the beginning of 2009, i.e., exactly at a time when the credit
outlook of Fiat improved again.
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From the inspection of these specific examples above, we may also argue that expressing the
credit quality of a company in terms of a continuous variable instead of a discrete ordinal measure
has some additional advantages from a stability viewpoint. We may argue that credit quality should
be expressed as a continuous variable. When a discrete credit rating changes, the corresponding
default probability changes discontinuously. This discontinuity may well spread over the markets,
especially if regulatory capital is a function of these ratings, leading to a substantial drop in the
company’s share price.12 A discontinuous change during difficult times may further nourish market
uncertainty by giving an incentive for creditors to run, precipitating a collapse and contagion. Our
default probabilities are continuous assessments of credit quality and may thus cause less market
disruption when the credit quality of a company deteriorates than the change of a discrete rating.
Furthermore, the through-the-cycle version TTC of our model is also a continuous credit assessment
but by construction less volatile than our original point-in-time model PIT and therefore potentially
even more appropriate for regulatory capital charges.
V. Out-of-Sample Validation
To test the out-of-sample forecasting performance of the estimated models in the previous sec-
tion, we will consider test statistics for the validation sample. We want to make forecasts with
the most powerful predictor and the resulting PD estimates of the most powerful predictor must
be calibrated. For regulatory purposes, the best performing through-the-cycle approach might be
preferable to the most powerful point-in-time model. Thus, in the following, we first discuss the
results on discrimination and then on calibration.13
A. Discrimination Testing
To assess the discriminatory power of the various models, we construct the empirical equivalent
of the Lorenz curve as defined in (1). That is, we order the observations according to their estimated
default probabilities from lowest to highest. Then, we analyze the number of defaults included in a
given fraction of the population. The results for the different models are shown in Table IV.
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[TABLE IV about here]
We see, for instance, that 25.54% of all defaults are included in the first nine deciles of the S&P
ratings. But for model PIT, only 12.60%, or one-half as many, defaults are included. Approximately
seven-eighths of all defaults are found in the 10th decile with the highest PD estimates versus only
three-quarters in the case of S&P. Even if, for fairness, we look at the through-the-cycle version
of our model (TTC), we find that 17.72% of all defaulters are included in the first nine deciles.
Therefore, we can conclude that the difference between S&P ratings and PIT indicates a superior
discriminatory power of the latter model. The superiority for the 90% quantile even holds for TTC,
i.e., under the provision for business cycle effects.
[Figure 7 about here]
In Figure 7, we plot the empirical Lorenz curves with which we can consider the discrimination for
any quantile. The area above the curve serves as our summary statistic for a model’s discriminatory
power. The larger the area, the better the discriminatory power. The PIT model generates an
area above the Lorenz curve of 94.83%, compared with an area of 92.34% for Altman’s ζ-score A1,
93.77% for Merton’s model M3, and 91.84% for S&P ratings. Even when we adjust our default
probabilities for the business cycle, we still have a higher area above the Lorenz curve than we would
obtain with S&P’s credit ratings, i.e., 93.30% for TTC versus 91.84% for S&P. Thus, the better
discriminatory power of our model PIT compared to the ratings is not purely based on the fact that
our PD increases on average before recessionary periods and decreases before expansions.
[TABLE V about here]
Table V presents the inferential statistics for the area above the Lorenz curve for PIT, Altman’s
ζ-score A1, Merton’s rank and power transformed model M3, S&P ratings, and our business cycle
adjusted model TTC with the t-values for the null hypothesis that the two areas above the Lorenz
curve are equal. We also include the naive forecast with no discriminatory power at all, which assumes
that all companies share the same default probability. As expected, we see that the approaches are
all significantly different from the naive forecasts. We also observe that our model’s PIT forecasts
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are significantly superior to all other models at the 1% significance level. Hence, the null hypothesis
of having the same discriminatory power must be rejected. The business cycle adjusted version
model TTC, however, is not statistically superior to S&P ratings at a reasonable confidence level.
Therefore, our through-the-cycle model TTC is at least as good as S&P in terms of discrimination
ability. We can reach the same conclusion when we look at Panel B of Figure 8 for the monthly time
series of areas above the Lorenz curves. For a clear majority of forecasting periods, model TTC
outperforms the S&P ratings. Note that, for a single time period, the ranking of PIT and TTC
is the same by construction and therefore both models have the same discrimination in Panel B of
Figure 8.
In the literature, e.g., Chava and Jarrow (2004) and Hillegeist, Keating, Cram, and Lundstedt
(2004), it has been concluded that the inclusion of market-based variables in the model renders the
accounting variables relatively unimportant for default forecasting. If we look at the test statistics
in Table V, we do not find support for such a conclusion. Although the accounting-based model A1
fails to be significantly more powerful than the S&P ratings, its marginal contribution to PIT is
highly significant. The marginal default signals stemming from accounting data are clearly relevant
when combined with the distance to default measure, in that PIT significantly outperformsM3. We
made the same observation when performing likelihood ratio tests in the estimation sample. Such
an empirical finding is substantiated theoretically by Proposition 1 and is therefore not surprising.
It is further noteworthy that TTC is significantly less powerful than PIT even though TTC
outperforms the S&P ratings. In light of these results, it seems questionable whether, as propounded
by many, default forecasts should be credit-cycle adjusted. Such an adjustment eventually results
in forecasts that are less powerful. Based on Lemma 1, we expected such an outcome, since the
information set with cycle data is greater than the set without. From an econometric perspective,
it is more difficult to include business cycle information in the forecasting than to simply filter it
out. In any case, to avoid pro-cyclical regulatory bank capital charges, our TTC version provides
non-cyclical conditional default probabilities that can be used for such purposes. However, from a
purely forecasting perspective, we clearly favor PIT over TTC.
Altogether, we find PIT to be the most powerful model and we should use this predictor to
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make powerful default forecasts. However, we still need to test whether the PD estimates of PIT are
calibrated, according to Definition 2. If yes, we are actually done, if no, we should look for a strictly
rank preserving transformation to make the PIT predictor not only powerful but also calibrated.
However, for the calculation of non-cyclical regulatory or economic capital requirements we should,
as a final step, also check whether the less powerful models TTC and S&P provide at least calibrated
forecasts.
B. Calibration Testing
Calibrated forecasts provide an unbiased estimate for the mean default rate and calibrated fore-
casts differentiate correctly between low and high default probabilities. Blo¨chlinger and Leippold
(2011) introduce the formal concept of level calibration for the former property and the concept
of shape calibration for the latter, and they show that a predictor that is both level- and shape-
calibrated is calibrated as in Definition 2. In the following, we will apply the single-period test
statistics on level and shape following Blo¨chlinger and Leippold (2011), as well as the multi-period
summary statistics of Blo¨chlinger (2012). The global null hypothesis states that the default forecasts
are calibrated in a given period. Thus, if we reject the null, we find miscalibrated forecasts in that
period. The aggregation of a series of single-period statistics into one multi-period statistic solves
the multiple testing problem.
[Figure 8 about here]
The level test compares realized with predicted default frequencies under the assumption of a
default correlation. To this end, we plot in Panel A of Figure 8 the realized 1-year default rate,
expressed as the fraction of firms that failed during the 1-year period. We compare this realized rate
to the mean PD estimate that was made at the beginning of the 1-year period. We first observe
that there is a strong variation over time in the frequency of defaults. In particular, there was a
long lasting increase around 1998 and a significant spike during the last crisis, with default rates
back to the pre-crisis level in 2011. Second, the S&P ratings mapped into “through the cycle default
probabilities” are very stable over time. In quiet times, they significantly overestimate defaults
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while in turbulent periods, they heavily underestimate defaults. However, the S&P ratings are not
intended to provide absolute measures of default risk, but our PIT model should. Hence, third, we
observe that our model PIT captures much of the broad variation in corporate failures over time. It
somewhat underestimates failures after 2000, and then overestimates slightly around 2010. However,
remember that not a single parameter was re-estimated after October 2000 (the end of the in-sample
period), i.e, the whole model remains completely unchanged after October 2000. By construction,
our mean PD estimate of model TTC is constant over time.
[Figure 9 about here]
On the left (right) hand side of Figure 9, we compare the expected Lorenz curve with the empirical
curve of PIT (TTC) to test the shape calibration hypothesis. The expected Lorenz curve shows
the fraction of expected defaults among the x% observations with the lowest PD estimates. The
empirical Lorenz curve then shows the corresponding fraction of realized defaults.14 According to
the PD ratios of PIT, we expect 1.3% (15.7%) of all defaults among the 50% (90%) observations
with the lowest PD estimates. This computation gives us two points on the expected Lorenz curve.
On the realized Lorenz curve, we obtain the corresponding points by replacing expected defaults with
realized defaults. That is, we experienced 0.8% (12.6%) defaults among the 50% (90%) observations
with the lowest PD estimates, which gives us two points on the empirical Lorenz curve. Repeating
this procedure for all percentiles gives us the expected and the realized Lorenz curves. Under the
null hypothesis of shape-calibrated forecasts, the expected curve and the true curve coincide. By
inspection of Figure 9, we observe that the empirical curve and the expected curve are quite close
both for PIT and TTC. However, we would still need a statistical test to claim that our models
PIT and TTC are indeed calibrated.
[TABLE VI about here]
Therefore, we now apply the single period statistical tests of Blo¨chlinger and Leippold (2011), as
well as the multi-period aggregation of Blo¨chlinger (2012). Loosely speaking, the shape test tells us
whether in Figure 9, the empirical Lorenz curve is statistically different from the expected Lorenz
curve. The level test tells us whether in Figure 8, the trajectories of the predicted and observed
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defaults are statistically different. In Table VI, we present the relevant test statistics, i.e., level,
shape, and the combined statistic, for PIT. The level statistic compares the realized default rate
with the mean PD estimate. The shape statistic depends on the difference between the realized
and expected areas above the Lorenz curve. Both normalized statistics are χ2-distributed with one
degree of freedom and stochastically independent. The combined statistic is an aggregated test on
both level and shape. It follows a χ2-distribution with two degrees of freedom. In Table VI, we
observe that in each year our model PIT provides calibrated forecasts.
Table VI shows the multi-period summary statistic on the last line. The multi-period statistic
is the sum of the corresponding independent single period statistics and thus is χ2-distributed. The
number of degrees of freedom equals the number of time periods for the shape statistics and level
statistics, and twice this number for the combined multi-period statistic. The null hypothesis of
level- and shape-calibrated forecasts clearly cannot be rejected for our PD estimates obtained with
PIT. Consequently, the PIT score in (16) represents the “true” distance to default measured as
the number of standard deviations away from default, so that the PD estimates of PIT are indeed
calibrated.
Table VII tabulates the multi-period level, shape, and combined statistics for PIT in comparison
to our benchmark models A1, M3, S&P, and TTC. Apart from S&P, the other models seem to
be calibrated overall as well, as seen from the p-values of the combined χ2<22>-statistics in brackets.
That is, the cycle adjusted version TTC of our point-in-time model provides calibrated forecasts even
though these forecasts are based only on relative risk and therefore on a restricted information set
that in effect disregards macroeconomic data. We can see that the two through-the-cycle approaches,
TTC and S&P, struggle with the level calibration, as expected since default dependencies are fully
driven by macroeconomic factors which can cause more tail events. The three other approaches
implicitly incorporate the macroeconomic outlook when making default predictions so that only
unanticipated macroeconomic forecasting errors drive default dependencies. Unexpectedly, however,
our S&P PD function, unlike, TTC is clearly not shape calibrated.
The PD ratio between the S&P rating classes seems not to be stable over time, as seen in Table
VIII. The relative ranking according to S&P in 2002 had a different meaning in terms of PD ratios
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between classes than in 2010. The PD ratio between non-investment grade issuers and investment
grade borrowers was lower in 2002 than in 2010. We cannot accept the null hypothesis that the PD
ratios are constant over time. As a consequence, we must clearly reject the calibration hypothesis
for S&P ratings. As listed in Table VIII, the realized area above the Lorenz curve in the period from
10/2001 to 10/2002 is 86.5% with a much higher expectation of 91.8%, causing a χ2<1>-value of 13.1
for that period. Hence, we observe far too many defaults among well rated borrowers relative to low
rated obligors when benchmarked against S&P’s PD ratios from Panel B of Figure 3. On the other
hand, the expected area between 10/2009 and 10/2010 of 90.8% is much lower than the realized
area of 97.3%, causing a χ2<1>-value of 7.4. In that year, we observe too few defaults in good rating
classes in comparison to low credit categories. Therefore, these two time periods with a χ2<2>-value
of 20.5 (=13.1+7.4) out of eleven periods already explain two-thirds of the χ2<11>-multi-period shape
statistic of 30.6, as shown in Table VII and Table VIII. This finding supports the conclusion of Alp
(2013), that a structural shift occurs from 2003 onwards towards more stringent ratings as investment
grade standards tightened.
Overall, we conclude this section with the observation that PIT is calibrated and is the most
powerful model. It is therefore recommended for making default predictions. Model TTC is a
calibrated and a cycle-adjusted version of PIT which is at least as powerful as the uncalibrated
S&P ratings and is recommended as input for the calculation of non-cyclical regulatory capital
requirements.
VI. Conclusion
We present a default prediction model that provides default probabilities for forecasting corpo-
rate credit defaults in a 1-year forecast horizon. Our model combines the distance-to-default model
of Merton (1974) and the reduced-form statistical approach of Altman (1968). Within a structural
model, we show that neither Merton’s nor Altman’s approach can lead to powerful default forecasts
when there are information asymmetries between the firm’s managers and capital market partici-
pants, with the effect that the firm’s asset value is only observable with noise. In fact, both Merton’s
and Altman’s approach are nested within our general structural model as two special cases when the
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asset value is either perfectly observable or unknown.
Our empirical analysis demonstrates that our default predictor provides calibrated forecasts in
each state of a credit cycle, i.e., the expected default frequencies match closely the realized frequen-
cies. We show that too restrictive distributional assumptions, such as normality, would result in a
lack of fit between the expected and realized default frequencies, and we resort to non-parametric
rank and power transformations to obtain well fitting models. In addition to being calibrated, our
model better discriminates defaulting firms from non-defaulting firms than the stand-alone concepts
and also better than Standard & Poor’s issuer ratings. Our model fulfills the regulators’ request that
an alternative for agency ratings should be transparent and replicable.
We also present an alternative version of our model that is based only on the relative rankings of
the current population of borrowers. This version in effect corrects our forecasts for business cycle
influences. In this cyclically adjusted version, the realized mean default rate deviates more from the
predicted level—as is to be expected when abstracting from the current state of the economy—but
the realized ratios of default frequencies in different percentiles still match closely the expected ratios.
Unlike our model, the interpretation of S&P rating classes in terms of probability ratios is not stable
over time. S&P seems to have become more stringent in its rating assignments. In any case, even
our cycle-adjusted version is calibrated and still at least as powerful as S&P ratings.
Especially for the sizeable money market, when both the counter-party default risk as well as
the default risk of the underlying collateral must be assessed for forecast horizons of up to one year,
our model is a sound and viable alternative to agency ratings. The adjusted version of our model
filters out macroeconomic influences and is therefore non-cyclical and well suited for the computation
of regulatory capital charges. We conclude that for the case of corporate default risk, appropriate,
transparent, powerful, and calibrated alternatives to agency ratings do indeed exist and are readily
available to be applied in practice.
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Appendix A. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. For readability, we define P = E [Y |G]. We have to show that the Lorenz curve
of P lies below the Lorenz curve of any G-measurable variable S. Without loss of generality but for
the sake of clarity, we assume that both P and S are continuous random variables.
According to the definition of the Lorenz curve, P is more powerful than S if
P {S ≤ s|Y = 1} ≥ P {P ≤ p|Y = 1} ,
for all s ∈ (−∞,+∞) and corresponding p ∈ [0, 1] such that P {S ≤ s} = P {P ≤ p}. To facilitate
the notation, we define the events A(s) and B(p) as
A(s) = {S ≤ s} and B(p) = {P ≤ p}, (A1)
where for arbitrary s ∈ (−∞,∞), p ∈ [0, 1] is chosen so that P {A} = P {B}. Due to the following
decomposition:15
A = A ∩ B+ A ∩ B¯ and B = A ∩ B+ A¯ ∩ B,
we deduce that P
{
A ∩ B¯
}
= P
{
A¯ ∩ B
}
. We distinguish between two cases: P
{
A ∩ B¯
}
= P
{
A¯ ∩ B
}
=
0 and P
{
A ∩ B¯
}
= P
{
A¯ ∩ B
}
> 0. In the first case, we can readily deduce A = B, up to a set of
probability measure zero, and therefore
P {A|Y = 1} = P {B|Y = 1} . (A2)
In the second case, if P
{
A ∩ B¯
}
= P
{
A¯ ∩ B
}
> 0, we have
E
[
Y |A ∩ B¯
]
= E
[
P |A ∩ B¯
]
> E
[
P |A¯ ∩ B
]
= E
[
Y |A¯ ∩ B
]
,
where the equalities follow by the law of iterated expectations. The inequality follows from the fact
that E
[
P |B¯
]
> E [P |B] and A, A¯ ∈ G. We multiply both sides by P
{
A ∩ B¯
}
(= P
{
A¯ ∩ B
}
):
E [1A1B¯Y ] = E [1A1B¯P ] > E [1A¯1BP ] = E [1A¯1BY ] ,
where 1A is the indicator variable for the event A. Adding E [1A1BY ] (= E [1A1BP ]) to both sides,
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we obtain
E [1AY ] = E [1AP ] > E [1BP ] = E [1BY ] .
Dividing both sides by P {Y = 1} results in
P {A|Y = 1} > P {B|Y = 1} . (A3)
Combining (A2) and (A3), we obtain:
P {A|Y = 1} ≥ P {B|Y = 1} whenever P {A} = P {B} ,
for all A and B as defined in (A1).
Proof of Proposition 1. By Assumption 2, the following linear transformation is Gaussian:
log V ∗ + U
log V ∗ + r


∣∣∣∣∣∣∣X ∼ N



 γ⊤X − α2/2
(γ + λ)⊤X − σ2/2

 ,

δ2 + α2 δ2
δ2 δ2 + σ2



 .
The conditional distribution of log V ∗+r| log V ∗+U,X is therefore also Gaussian (see, e.g., Hamilton
(1994), p. 102 for a proof):
log V ∗ + r|V,X ∼ N
(
(γ + λ)⊤X −
σ2
2
+
δ2
δ2 + α2
(
log V − γ⊤X +
1
2
α2
)
, δ2 + σ2 −
δ4
δ2 + α2
)
,
where log V = log V ∗ + U from Assumption 1. Hence, the conditional expectation of the default
indicator 1{V ∗ exp(r)≤F} given F , V , and X can be written as
P {V ∗ exp (r) ≤ F |F, V,X} = Φ

 log F − (γ + λ)⊤X + σ22 − δ2δ2+α2
(
log V − γ⊤X + α
2
2
)
√
δ2 + σ2 − δ
4
δ2+α2

 . (A4)
Recalling the definition of the distance to default measure DD,
DD =
log V − logF + λ⊤X − 0.5σ2
σ
,
we can write the default probability in (A4) as
PD = Φ
(
β0 + β1 logF + β
⊤
2 X + βDDDD
)
, (A5)
with
βDD = −σ
1√
σ2 + δ2 − δ
4
δ2+α2
δ2
δ2 + α2
,
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as well as
β0 =
1
2
1√
σ2 + δ2 − δ
4
δ2+α2
α2
δ2 + α2
[
σ2 − δ2
]
β1 =
1√
σ2 + δ2 − δ
4
δ2+α2
α2
δ2 + α2
β2 = −
1√
σ2 + δ2 − δ
4
δ2+α2
α2
δ2 + α2
(γ + λ) . (A6)
Finally, when V ∗ is also known, then the only randomness stems from the return r, which is condi-
tionally Gaussian with mean λ⊤X−σ2/2 and variance σ2 such that P {V ∗ exp (r) ≤ F |F, V,X, V ∗} =
Φ(−DD∗).
Proof of Proposition 2. We will first prove this for the conditional default probability given DD, i.e.,
Merton’s adjusted PD in (11). By bivariate normality,
 Z
DD

 ∼ N



 µZ
µDD

 ,

 σ2Z ρσZσDD
ρσZσDD σ
2
DD



 , (A7)
we have the following conditional distribution for Z given DD (see p. 102 in Hamilton (1994)):
Z|DD ∼ N
(
µZ + ρ
σZ
σDD
(DD − µDD) , σ
2
Z
(
1− ρ2
))
. (A8)
Using (A8) we can explicitly compute the conditional probability P {Y = 1|DD}. First, we apply
the law of iterated expectation:
P {Y = 1|DD} = E [P {Y = 1|Z,DD}|DD] = E [Φ (Z + βDDDD)|DD] ,
where the second equality imputes the conditional probability given Z and DD from (7). Next, we
use the conditional normal distribution from (A8):
E [Φ (Z + βDDDD)|DD] =
1
σZ
√
1− ρ2
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ (ν + βDDDD)φ
(
ν − µz − ρ
σZ
σDD
(DD − µDD)
σZ
√
1− ρ2
)
dν
=
∫ ∞
−∞
Φ
(
ξ σZ
√
1− ρ2 + µZ − ρ
σZ
σDD
µDD +DD
(
βDD + ρ
σZ
σDD
))
φ(ξ) dξ
= Φ

µZ − ρ σZσDDµDD +DD
(
βDD + ρ
σZ
σDD
)
√
1 + σ2Z (1− ρ
2)

 , (A9)
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where φ (·) is the probability distribution function of a standard Gaussian variable. The second line
makes a variable substitution, the last line computes the definite integral of a Gaussian function.
To calculate Altman’s PD in (12), we start with the conditional random variable DD|Z:
DD|Z ∼ N
(
µDD + ρ
σDD
σZ
(Z − µZ) , σ
2
DD
(
1− ρ2
))
,
and perform exactly the same steps as above to obtain the desired result:
E [Φ (Z + βDDDD)|Z] = Φ

βDDµDD − ρβDD σDDσZ µZ + Z
(
1 + ρβDD
σDD
σZ
)
√
1 + β2DDσ
2
DD(1− ρ
2)

 . (A10)
Finally, to obtain the naive PD in (13), we either integrate over DD ∼ N(µDD, σ
2
DD) in (A9),
or over Z ∼ N(µZ , σ
2
Z) in (A10), or directly over Z + βDDD ∼ N(µZ + βDDµDD, σ
2
Z + β
2
DDσ
2
DD +
2ρσZβDDσDD). All ways lead to the same naive PD in (13), by the law of iterated expectations,
E [E [Φ (Z + βDDDD)|Z]] = E [E [Φ (Z + βDDDD)|DD]] = E [Φ (Z + βDDDD)] = P {Y = 1} ,
and by calculation of definite integrals of Gaussian functions.
Proof of Proposition 3. By assumption, logF and X follow a multivariate Gaussian distribution:
logF
X

 ∼ N



µF
µX

 ,

 σ2F ΣF,X
Σ⊤F,X ΣX,X



 , (A11)
so that the transformations Z = β0 + β1 log F + β
⊤
2 X, DD =
(
log (V/F ) + µ− 0.5σ2
)
/σ follow the
bivariate Gaussian distribution in (A7) with the parameters
µZ = β0 + β1µF + β
⊤
2 µX , σ
2
Z =

β1
β2


⊤
 σ2F ΣF,X
Σ⊤F,X ΣX,X



β1
β2

 ,
µDD =
1
σ
(
(λ+ γ)⊤µX −
1
2
α2 − µF −
1
2
σ2
)
,
σ2DD =
1
σ2



 −1
λ+ γ


⊤
 σ2F ΣF,X
Σ⊤F,X ΣX,X



 −1
λ+ γ

+ δ2 + α2

 ,
σZ,DD =
1
σ2

 −1
λ+ γ


⊤
 σ2F ΣF,X
Σ⊤F,X ΣX,X



β1
β2

 , ρ = σZ,DD
σZσDD
.
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From Proposition 2, we have that the conditional probability P {Y = 1|DD} = Φ(b0 + bDDDD)
with b0 and bDD given by
b0 =
µZ − ρµDD
σZ
σDD√
1 + σ2Z(1− ρ
2)
, and bDD =
βDD + ρ
σZ
σDD√
1 + σ2Z(1− ρ
2)
.
Now, using the definition of ω,
ω :=

 −1
γ + λ


⊤
 σ2F ΣF,X
Σ⊤F,X ΣX,X



 −1
γ + λ

 ≥ 0,
together with the parameters β0, β1, β2 given in (A6) from Proposition 1, we can write b0 and bDD
with the original parameters of the multivariate distribution in (A11) as
b0 =
α2
α2+δ2
[
σ2−δ2
2 + µF − (γ + λ)
⊤µX +
ω
ω+δ2+α2
{
(γ + λ)⊤µX − µF −
α2+σ2
2
}]
√
σ2 + δ2 − δ
4
α2+δ2
+ ω
(
α2
α2+δ2
)2 (
1− ω
ω+δ2+α2
) , (A12)
and
bDD = −
σ
(
δ2
α2+δ2
+ α
2
α2+δ2
ω
ω+δ2+α2
)
√
σ2 + δ2 − δ
4
α2+δ2
+ ω
(
α2
α2+δ2
)2 (
1− ω
ω+δ2+α2
) ,
with bDD a continuous function of α. Further, bDD is equal to −1 if α = 0, and bDD = 0 if α→∞.
Also, bDD is strictly increasing in α
2, so that ∂bDD/∂α
2 > 0, since
∂bDD
∂α2
=
σ
2
(
δ2 + ω
) [
2α2
(
δ2 + σ2 + ω
)
+
(
δ2 + ω
) (
δ2 + 2σ2 + ω
)]
(α2 + δ2 + ω)2 [α2 (δ2 + σ2 + ω) + σ2 (δ2 + ω)]
√
α2δ2
α2+δ2
+ σ2
√
α4ω
(α2(δ2+σ2)+δ2σ2)(α2+δ2+ω)
+ 1
.
Therefore, if α ∈ (0,∞), then we have bDD ∈ (−1, 0) by monotonicity, and from (A12) we see that
b0 is finite, i.e., b0 ∈ (−∞,+∞). We determine the intersection point c for which Merton’s original
PD, Φ (−DD), coincides with the adjusted PD, Φ (b0 + bDDDD):
Φ (b0 + bDDc) = Φ (−c) ⇔ c = −
b0
1 + bDD
,
and we have therefore the following relation:
b0 + bDDDD > −DD if DD > c
b0 + bDDDD < −DD if DD < c.
Since the cumulative distribution function Φ(·) is monotonic we are done, i.e., with Φ(−DD) we
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overestimate the true default probability if DD < c, i.e., high risks, and we underestimate the true
probability if DD > c, i.e., low risks.
Appendix B. Replication of the Augmented Prediction Model
Appendix B is added so that our augmented prediction model PIT in (14) is fully transparent
and easily replicable. We first show the computation of the distance to default measure. Second, we
describe the calculation of Altman’s financial ratios.
Constructing the Distance to Default Measure. The structural default model of Merton
(1974) stipulates that the equity value of a firm can be interpreted as an option on the firm’s asset.
Under the assumption of a Gaussian distributed asset return, the equity value E of a firm having
issued just one discount bond with a remaining maturity of one year satisfies
E = V Φ(d+ σ)− e−rfFΦ(d), (B1)
where d is the so-called risk-neutral distance to default measure
d =
log V − logF + rf − 0.5σ
2
σ
. (B2)
In Equation (B1), we denote by V the market value of the firm’s total assets, F is the face amount
of the firm’s debt, rf is the continuously compounded risk-free interest rate, Φ(·) is the cumulative
distribution function of a standardized Gaussian variable, and σ is the volatility of the firm’s total
assets. Merton’s distance to default measure DD as given in (2) can be written as the risk-neutral
distance to default measure d plus a standardized risk premium:
DD = d+
µ− rf
σ
, (B3)
where µ is the expected return on the firm’s total assets V . By Itoˆ’s lemma, asset volatility σ and
equity volatility σE are related by
σE =
V
E
∂E
∂V
σ =
V
E
Φ(d+ σ)σ, (B4)
where d is defined in (B2).
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We follow closely the implementation of Bharath and Shumway (2008) to estimate DD in (B3).
The procedure can be described in four steps. In the first step, we estimate the equity volatility σE
from historical daily stock returns over a rolling window of one year. In the second step, we choose
a measure for the firm’s nominal amount of debt F by using current liabilities plus one-half of long
term debt. The third step is to collect daily market equity values and risk-free rates in the firm’s
home country. The equity value E unlike V is observable in the marketplace by multiplying the
firm’s outstanding shares by its current stock price. We approximate the 1-year risk-free rate rf by
the generic on-the-run government bill, note, or bond index.16 The first three steps give us values for
each of the variables in Equations (B1) and (B4) except for V and σ. Hence, in the fourth and most
significant step, we estimate V and σ. Simultaneously solving the two Equations (B1) and (B4) for
V and σ seems quite straightforward. However, Crosbie and Bohn (2003) state that “in practice the
market leverage [F/V ] moves around far too much for [Equation (B4)] to provide reasonable results.”
To resolve this issue, we first choose a starting value σ = σEE/(E + F ) and use this starting value
together with Equation (B1) to infer the market value of each firm’s assets every day for the previous
year. We then compute the log differences from the implied asset values and use that time series
to calculate standard deviation and mean to update our estimates for σ and µ. We iterate on σ in
this way until convergence (i.e., until the absolute difference in adjacent σs is less than 0.001). With
this last step we obtain V and σ to compute the risk-neutral distance to default d in (B2) as well
as µ to compute the risk adjustment for DD in Equation (B3). For a small number of companies at
certain points in time, the iterative procedure does not converge within 14 iterations. We drop the
few non-converging observations.
Note that with this procedure, the estimate for µ can be lower than rf . Based on our theoretical
arguments, we have to work with the risk-adjusted DD as a function of µ instead of the risk-neutral
d as a function of rf . The estimation of µ is quite important as reported by Bharath and Shumway
(2004). As somehow expected by our structural model, the default predictor that sets µ equal to
the risk free rate rf performs substantially worse in the empirical analysis of Bharath and Shumway
(2004).
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Altman’s Accounting-Based Variables. Altman (1968)) and Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan
(1977) present two accounting-based credit scores. The former is called the Z-score with five financial
ratios, the latter is the ζ-score with seven financial figures.
The Z-score incorporates the following five variables:
Z1 compares liquid assets to total assets. The ratio is computed as working capital (current assets
minus current liabilities) divided by total assets.
Z2 quantifies the cumulative profitability over time as the ratio of retained earnings to total assets.
Z3 illustrates the productivity of the firm’s assets, abstracting from leverage and taxes. The ratio
is calculated as earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) divided by total assets. We compute
EBIT by summing up EBIT for the most recent four quarters. EBIT is after amortization of
goodwill.
Z4 is a measure for leverage, and the only ratio of the Z-score which contains market prices. The
ratio is defined as the market value of equity divided by the book value of total debt. We
compute the market value of the equity by multiplying the number of shares by the closing
price of the share. The number of shares is the number of primary common shares of all classes
outstanding, net of treasury shares.
Z5 quantifies the sales-generating ability of the firm as the ratio of sales to total assets. We
consider the trailing twelve-month sales, i.e., the sum of the quarterly sales of the most recent
four quarters.
The ζ-score model contains the following seven variables:
ζ1 corresponds to the ratio Z3 of the older Z-score model, EBIT divided by total assets. However,
original ζ-score model Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan (1977) includes total tangible assets
as the denominator. Since many companies in our sample do not disclose intangibles, we use
total assets instead.
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ζ2 quantifies the stability of the earnings. Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan (1977) describe
this measure as a normalized measure of the standard error of the estimate around a ten-
year trend in ζ1. We compute this variable as the coefficient of determination (R-squared)
with the trailing twelve-month EBIT as the dependent variable, and time as the independent
variable. If EBIT follows a trend, this variable is close to one, whereas it is close to zero if the
time series of EBIT cannot be well explained with a trend line. We choose a five-year trend.
We compute R-squared as soon as three values for ζ1 are available (this is usually the sixth
reporting quarter).
ζ3 measures the ability of the firm to meet its liabilities (debt service). This variable is computed as
EBIT divided by total interest payments, plus working capital divided by long term debt. Total
interest payments are computed as the trailing twelve-month payments, i.e., the cumulated
interest payments of the latest four quarters. Long term debt is total liabilities minus current
liabilities.
ζ4 is Z2 of the Z-score, cumulative profitability, computed as retained earnings divided by total
assets.
ζ5 measures liquidity by the current ratio, which is current assets divided by current liabilities.
ζ6 is the capitalization, measured as common equity divided by total capital. In the numerator
of this ratio, the common equity is measured by the market value of the total equity, rather
than the book value.
ζ7 measures size by total assets relative to the median asset value among the underlying population
of issuers. Otherwise, size would be the only variable in the Z-score and the ζ-score model
which has a unit, and from an econometric perspective it would have a unit root, and therefore
not be mean-reverting.
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Figure 1. Long-term RDD and Current Ranking rt,DD of Distance to Default DD
We applied a rank transformation RDD (dotted line) to Merton’s distance to default measure DD
for a population of issuers over a business cycle (=long-term ranking) and we applied a rank trans-
formation rt,DD to all observations at the end of January 2009 (solid line) and the end of January
2011 (dashed line).
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Figure 2. Rank and Square Root Transformation of Financial Ratios
We applied a rank transformation (dashed line) to the original financial ratios suggested by
Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan (1977) to predict corporate defaults. To obtain a better fit
of the data, we further applied a square root transformation (solid line) to the rank transform of
the four ζ variables. The four functions are estimated on an estimation sample and then applied
to a validation sample. We modified ζ7 from Altman, Haldeman, and Narayanan (1977) in that we
measure the size not in dollars but relatively to the median total assets of the underlying population
of borrowers at that time. Otherwise, the time series of size would contain a unit root.
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Figure 3. Mapping Distance to Default and Ratings to Default Probabilities
In Panel A we plot the mapping of the distance to default to default probabilities using different
Merton models: the original Merton model M1 (dotted line), Merton’s adjusted model M2 (dashed
line), and Merton’s rank- and power-transformed model M3 (solid line). Panel B shows the mapping
of S&P rating classes into default probabilities estimated by simple count statistics. To have strictly
positive PD values and to have a monotone PD function, we interpolate between BBB+ and BBB-
to obtain the PD for BBB rated borrowers and we assign 0.02% to A+, A, A-, 0.01% to AA+, AA,
AA- as well as 0.001% to AAA. The dashed vertical line separates investment from non-investment
grades.
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Figure 4. Joint Distribution of ζ-score and Distance to Default DD
In Panel A, we plot the rank-transformed ζ-score and distance to default DD for the estimation
sample. In Panel B, we plot the same graph for the validation sample. These two credit measures
are correlated. Spearman’s rank correlation shows a coefficient of 64.1% in the estimation sample
and 57.1% in the validation sample. Most defaults are concentrated in the highest decile.
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Figure 5. Defaulting Companies
One-year ahead default probability forecasts for the defaulting companies Enron, Parmalat, Delphi,
and General Motors. The estimation sample period used for calibrating the models ranges from
1982 to 1999. The forecasts starting from 10/2000 are all out-of-sample. Enron went bankrupt
in December 2001, Parmalat defaulted in December 2003, Delphi filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy
protection in October 2005, and the Chapter 11 filing of GM took place in June 2009.
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Figure 6. Non-Defaulted Companies
One-year-ahead default probability forecasts for non-defaulting companies: Fiat, General Electric,
Coca-Cola, and McDonald’s. The estimation sample period used for calibrating the models is 1982–
1999. The forecasts starting from 10/2000 are all out-of-sample.
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Figure 7. Lorenz Curve for Discrimination Testing
Empirical Lorenz curves for the various models for the validation sample from 10/2000 to 10/2010.
Based on the empirical curves, PIT is more powerful than Altman’s ζ-score, A1, Merton’s distance
to default, M3, and S&P’s corporate issuer rating.
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Figure 8. Predicted versus Realized Default Rate and Discriminatory Power
Panel A compares the realized 1-year default rate to the mean PD predicted one year earlier. The
dash-dotted line displays the mean PD computed from S&P’s “through the cycle probabilities,” the
solid line displays the mean PD computed from model PIT, the dotted straight line is the mean PD
of model TTC (which, by construction, is constant over time), the dashed line is the realized default
rate. Panel B shows the empirical area over the Lorenz curve for S&P ratings, model PIT, and
TTC, also on a monthly basis for default predictions over a 1-year forecast horizon. The vertical
dashed line separates the estimation sample from the validation sample.
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Figure 9. Lorenz Curves for Shape Calibration Testing
The empirical and the expected Lorenz curves of modelsPIT andTTC. Under the null hypotheses of
shape calibrated forecasts, the empirical curves converge towards the expected curve with increasing
sample size. Both models are shape calibrated.
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Notes
1Some suggest simply replacing agency ratings with credit default swap (CDS) prices. In this
line, Chava, Ganduri, and Ornthanalai (2012) find that markets react less to credit rating down-
grades when the firm has CDS trading on its debt. However, CDS spreads incorporate a premium
for systematic risk, which induces a bias in the default forecast. Two obligors with equal default
probabilities can have different CDS spreads, depending on the economic state in which they tend
to fail, see Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009), or Blo¨chlinger (2011).
2For instance: “Standard & Poor’s credit ratings are not exact measures of the probability that a
certain issuer or issue will default but are instead expressions of the relative credit risk of rated issuers
and debt instruments.” As of November 2012, Moody’s writes on its web site: “Moody’s ratings
represent the opinion of Moody’s Investors Service as to the relative creditworthiness of securities.”.
Similary, Fitch: “Credit ratings are opinions on relative credit quality and not a predictive measure
of specific default probability.”
3Hosmer and Lemeshow’s goodness-of-fit test divides observations into deciles from lowest to
highest risk based on estimated probabilities, then computes a χ2-statistic from the observed and
expected frequencies, and a p-value is computed from the χ2-distribution to test the fit of the model.
4Duffie, Saita, and Wang (2007) assume an autoregressive Gaussian process of order one for the
two-dimensional process of distance to default and log asset value, and they impose similar restrictions
on the three-month and ten-year Treasury rate process as well as on the S&P return process.
5The joint notice issued by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, requests that the
replacement of agency ratings in regulation requires that a potential alternative must be sufficiently
transparent, unbiased, replicable, and defined so as to allow banking organizations of varying size
and complexity to arrive at the same assessment of creditworthiness for similar exposures and to
allow appropriate supervisory review. See the Federal Register Volume 76, Number 245 (Wednesday,
December 21, 2011), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2011-12-21/html/2011-32073.htm.
6We will resort to the classical probit analysis as described by Maddala (1983) to obtain estimates
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of (4). We also performed probit estimations including random effects to account for default depen-
dencies. However, the resulting PD estimates do not change dramatically and our estimates without
random effects perform just as well in the validation sample. Further, the academic literature, such
as Shumway (2001), Chava and Jarrow (2004), and Campbell, Hilscher, and Szilagyi (2008), is also
based on logistic regressions without random effects.
7We use the same database as in Blo¨chlinger (2012), which was extended by one year and enriched
by the Z-score and ζ-score variables. We thank Basile Maire for augmenting the dataset.
8The influence of accounting data can vary over a quarter as in the model of Duffie and Lando
(2001), newly released data seems slightly more relevant than stale accounting information towards
the end of the quarter. However, our main results regarding discrimination and calibration remain
unchanged if we choose another reference month. In particular, we performed the equivalent empirical
analysis for end of November data.
9See, e.g., Altman and Rijken (2006) for a discussion of the difference between the point-in-time
and through-the-cycle approaches.
10See the amendments to rule 15c3-1, http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2011/34-64352.pdf.
11See, e.g., Association for Financial Professionals (2002)
12A prominent example of such an epidemic effect is the downgrade of AIG in 2008, leading to
multiple collateral calls, increased liquidity stress, and falling market confidence.
13To derive test statistics on discrimination and calibration, we will consider default dependencies
under the assumptions of Blo¨chlinger (2012). In particular, we assume that default dependence
within one year is driven by a single factor following a β-distribution. Conditional on this factor,
defaults are independent and Bernoulli distributed. The dependency is completely specified with two
parameters, the factor loading ω, and the factor volatility σ. We choose ω = 0.8, and σ = 0.7889.
For details regarding the choice of these parameters, and technical details of the tests, we refer to
Blo¨chlinger (2012).
14To clarify, we give a simple example: Suppose that a credit portfolio consists of two borrower
groups of equal size, one group with a PD estimate of 1/2 p, the other group with a PD estimate of
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3/2 p with p ∈ (0, 2/3). In this case, we expect to observe 25% of all defaults in the first group and
75% in the second group, independently of the PD level p. If the true PD ratio between the two
groups is indeed 3 to 1, then the expected Lorenz curve coincides with the true Lorenz curve.
15As a mnemonic device, we use A+ B to denote A ∪ B when A and B are disjoint.
16For each of the following currencies, we have interest rates available: AUD, BRL, CAD, CHF,
EUR, GBP, HKD, IDR, INR, JPY, KRW, MXN, MYR, NOK, NZD, SEK, SGD, THB, USD. For
the remaining currencies, we use the interest rates in parentheses: ARS (USD), CLP (USD), CZK
(EUR), DKK (EUR), INR (USD), KWD (USD), TRY (EUR), TWD (JPY).
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Table I
Data Summary
We divide our data into an estimation sample covering the period from 1982 to 1999, and a validation sample with data from 2000
to 2010. Our S&P ratings data end in October 2011, hence the last date for which we can analyze whether a given company defaults
within one year is October 2010. The estimation sample contains 1,581 firms, the validation sample 2,549 firms. There are 347 firms
that defaulted, 93 are in the estimation sample, 254 in the validation sample. We have 24,411 firm-year observations in total.
Industry Total firms Total firm-years Defaults
1982–1999 2000–2010 1982–1999 2000–2010 1982–1999 2000–2010
Aerospace/Automotive/Capital Goods/Metal 258 425 1,297 2,982 9 51
Consumer/Service Sector 298 446 1,624 2,983 28 45
Energy and Natural Resources 139 245 614 1,511 8 12
Forest & Building Products/Homebuilders 105 137 553 952 9 21
Health Care/Chemicals 171 280 880 1,858 8 14
High Tech/Computers/Office Equipment 135 221 686 1,273 8 9
Leisure Time/Media 185 232 738 1,517 13 29
Real Estate 8 37 14 217 0 1
Telecommunications 78 166 264 860 4 45
Transportation 69 124 341 803 6 20
Utility 135 236 673 1,771 0 7
Total 1,581 2,549 7,684 16,727 93 254
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Table II
Estimation of Merton’s Model, Altman’s Model and Combinations
Results from different probit regression models that transform the two ordinal credit risk measures
distance to default and ζ-score into a 1-year default probability. The corresponding t-values are
reported in brackets. We denote by ‘∗’ and ‘∗∗’ significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
The estimates are derived from our estimation sample covering the S&P corporate data base for the
period from 1982 to October 1999.
Variable M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 A1 PIT TTC
Constant 0 -1.57∗∗ -4.49∗∗ -3.66∗∗ -4.96∗∗ -2.88∗∗ -3.37∗∗
(-29.54) (-10.79) (-10.73) (-10.99) (-5.41) (-13.25)
DD -1 -0.34∗∗
(-13.46)
RDD(DD) 2.64
∗∗ 1.06∗ 3.33∗∗ 1.79∗∗
(5.17) (2.16) (6.25) (3.41)
RDD(DD)
p 1.63∗∗ 2.04∗∗ 1.56∗∗ 1.27∗∗
(7.36) (7.79) (6.80) (5.39)
rt,S(S) 0.83
∗
(2.09)
rt,S(S)
p 1.99∗∗
(8.08)
Z -1.00∗∗ -0.40∗∗
(-38.42) (-4.21)
Exponent p 0 30 10 50 30 10
Log likelihood -1158.02 -330.31 -321.32 -321.70 -324.65 -351.2 -311.71 -332.46
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Table III
Estimation of Z-score and ζ-score
We estimate several probit regression models. To limit the influence of outliers, we either Winsorize
the data at the 2.5% and 97.5% quantiles to estimate the Z-score and the ζ-score, or we rank
transform the data, or we transform the data twice by first applying a rank transformation and then
second a square-root transformation. The corresponding t-values are shown in brackets. We denote
by ‘∗’ and ‘∗∗’ significance at the 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Z-score Z-score ζ-score ζ-score ζ-score ζ-score
(Wins.) (rank tr.) (Wins.) (rank tr.) (rank tr.) (twice tr.)
Constant -2.00∗∗ -1.02∗∗ -1.64∗∗ -0.55∗∗ -0.73∗∗ 0.22
(-21.48) (-8.05) (-12.23) (-3.50) (-7.03) (1.35)
Z1: WorkCap/Assets -0.49 -0.29
(-1.76) (-1.68)
Z2, ζ4: Profitability -0.76
∗∗ -1.08∗∗ -3.99∗∗ -1.07∗∗ -0.77∗∗ -0.99∗∗
(-5.32) (-4.43) (-5.11) (-3.68) (-2.66) (-3.45)
Z3, ζ1: EBIT/assets -4.72
∗∗ -1.30∗∗ 0.23 0.32∗
(-6.86) (-5.30) (1.67) (2.03)
Z4: Leverage -0.14
∗∗ -1.81∗∗
(-2.98) (-6.52)
Z5: Sales/assets 0.16
∗∗ 0.45∗∗
(2.54) (2.72)
ζ2: Earn. stability 0.00 0.11
(1.16) (-0.35)
ζ3: Debt service -0.71
∗∗ -0.98∗∗ -1.01∗∗ -0.67∗∗
(-4.38) (-3.70) (-3.91) (-2.62)
ζ5: Current ratio -0.12
∗ -0.48∗∗
(-2.54) (-2.91)
ζ6: Capitalization -0.54
∗∗ -1.63∗∗ -1.62∗∗ -1.88∗∗
(-4.93) (-6.20) (-6.40) (-8.21)
ζ7: Relative log size -0.19
∗∗ -1.41∗∗ -1.28∗∗ -1.31∗∗
(-5.60) (-6.54) (-6.12) (-6.30)
Log likelihood -407.63 -376.85 -367.60 -355.28 -368.74 -351.20
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Table IV
Discriminatory Power
Discriminatory power of different forecasting models. The observations are ranked in descending
order according to credit quality. The first column reports the fraction of the population included.
For a given fraction of the population, we list the fraction of defaults. We list the corresponding
percentages for the different models in the subsequent columns.
Fraction of Fraction of defaulters included
population included A1 M3 S&P PIT TTC
50.00% 1.18% 1.57% 1.85% 0.79% 1.57%
75.00% 8.66% 5.51% 8.31% 3.94% 4.33%
80.00% 11.02% 6.69% 10.46% 5.12% 7.48%
85.00% 14.96% 9.84% 17.04% 7.09% 11.02%
90.00% 20.87% 18.09% 25.54% 12.60% 17.72%
95.00% 35.81% 29.84% 41.15% 26.76% 33.85%
96.00% 43.70% 36.22% 47.63% 31.89% 42.52%
97.00% 52.77% 44.89% 54.33% 40.56% 50.80%
98.00% 64.99% 53.91% 61.03% 52.42% 61.85%
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Table V
Discrimination Testing: t-Values in Cross Tests
The table reports the discrimination tests for the out-of-sample statistical analysis. The first column
reports the area above the Lorenz curve. The larger the area, the more powerful are the forecasts
to separate defaulters from non-defaulters. The other columns report the t-values of testing the
discrimination of different models against each other. We denote by ‘∗’ and ‘∗∗’ significance at the
5% and 1% level, respectively.
Area above vs. vs. vs. vs. vs. vs.
Lorenz curve naive A1 M3 S&P PIT TTC
A1 92.34% 59.130∗∗ – -2.194∗ 0.664 -4.998∗∗ -1.559
M3 93.77% 65.437∗∗ 2.194∗ – 2.255∗ -4.962∗∗ 1.290
S&P 91.84% 58.854∗∗ -0.664 -2.255∗ – -3.850∗∗ -1.723
PIT 94.83% 78.075∗∗ 4.998∗∗ 4.962∗∗ 3.850∗∗ – 4.448∗∗
TTC 93.30% 63.857∗∗ 1.559 -1.290 1.723 -4.448∗∗ –
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Table VI
Calibration Testing of 1-Year Default Probabilities of Model PIT
Calibration tests for model PIT. We denote by ‘∗’ and ‘∗∗’ significance at the 5% and 1% level,
respectively, with the corresponding p-values in brackets. The level statistic compares the realized
default rate (real. PD) with the expected rate (exp. PD). The shape statistic depends on the difference
between the realized (real. area) and the expected area (exp. area) above the Lorenz curve. Both
statistics have a χ2-distribution with one degree of freedom. The combined statistic is a summary
statistic on level and shape (χ2-distributed with two degrees of freedom). The p-values of the three
statistics are shown in brackets. The last line shows the multi-period test statistic, the sum of the
yearly statistics which follow a χ2<11>- or χ
2
<22>-distribution, respectively.
obs. def. exp. real. exp. real. level shape comb.
time period PD PD area area
10/2000–10/2001 1,213 45 2.40% 3.71% 0.916 0.917 0.940 0.002 0.942
(0.332) (0.961) (0.624)
10/2001–10/2002 1,310 45 2.55% 3.44% 0.921 0.926 0.544 0.085 0.629
(0.461) (0.770) (0.730)
10/2002–10/2003 1,360 29 2.48% 2.13% 0.919 0.951 0.001 2.556 2.557
(0.976) (0.110) (0.278)
10/2003–10/2004 1,551 14 0.50% 0.90% 0.936 0.949 1.528 0.134 1.662
(0.216) (0.714) (0.436)
10/2004–10/2005 1,653 15 0.57% 0.91% 0.946 0.954 1.027 0.055 1.081
(0.311) (0.815) (0.582)
10/2005–10/2006 1,666 6 0.43% 0.36% 0.943 0.988 0.000 0.638 0.638
(0.999) (0.424) (0.727)
10/2006–10/2007 1,724 6 0.42% 0.35% 0.942 0.990 0.000 0.678 0.679
(0.984) (0.410) (0.712)
10/2007–10/2008 1,642 15 0.56% 0.91% 0.947 0.927 1.147 0.359 1.506
(0.284) (0.549) (0.471)
10/2008–10/2009 1,619 52 3.40% 3.21% 0.893 0.909 0.030 0.801 0.831
(0.862) (0.371) (0.660)
10/2009–10/2010 1,518 19 0.92% 1.25% 0.900 0.942 0.567 1.630 2.198
(0.451) (0.202) (0.333)
10/2010–10/2011 1,471 8 0.43% 0.54% 0.924 0.984 0.432 1.325 1.757
(0.511) (0.250) (0.415)
10/2000–10/2011 16,727 254 1.27% 1.52% 0.939 0.948 6.216 8.264 14.480
(0.859) (0.689) (0.884)
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Table VII
Calibration Testing: χ2-Values for Level, Shape and Combined Statistics
The multi-period level, shape and combined statistics. We denote by ‘∗’ and ‘∗∗’ significance at the
5% and 1% level, respectively. All models except S&P provide calibrated forecasts, i.e., we cannot
reject the combined multi-period calibration hypothesis for all but S&P. The underlying reason for
S&P’s miscalibration is that the PD ratio (=shape) between non-investment graded issuers and
investment rated borrowers was significantly lower in 2002 than in 2010 (see Table VIII). The cycle
adjusted version TTC provides calibrated forecasts even though that these forecasts are based only
on relative risks and therefore disregard macroeconomic information.
level χ2<11> shape χ
2
<11> combined χ
2
<22>
A1 7.744 12.711 20.456
(0.736) (0.313) (0.555)
M3 9.326 12.263 21.588
(0.592) (0.344) (0.485)
S&P 19.141 30.571∗∗ 49.711∗∗
(0.059) (0.001) (0.001)
PIT 6.216 8.264 14.480
(0.859) (0.689) (0.884)
TTC 21.365∗ 9.256 30.621
(0.030) (0.598) (0.104)
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Table VIII
Calibration Testing of 1-Year Default Probabilities of S&P
Calibration tests for S&P ratings. We denote by ‘∗’ and ‘∗∗’ significance at the 5% and 1% level,
respectively, with the corresponding p-values in brackets. The level statistic compares the realized
default rate (real. PD) with the expected rate (exp. PD). The shape statistic depends on the difference
between the realized (real. area) and the expected area (exp. area) above the Lorenz curve. Both
statistics have a χ2-distribution with one degree of freedom. The combined statistic is a summary
statistic on level and shape (χ2-distributed with two degrees of freedom). The p-values of the three
statistics are shown in brackets. The last line shows the multi-period test statistic, the sum of the
yearly statistics which follow a χ2<11>- or χ
2
<22>-distribution, respectively.
obs. def. exp. real. exp. real. level shape comb.
time period PD PD area area
10/2000–10/2001 1,213 45 1.65% 3.71% 0.913 0.912 2.731 0.007 2.738
(0.098) (0.933) (0.254)
10/2001–10/2002 1,310 45 1.61% 3.44% 0.918 0.865 2.411 13.116∗∗ 15.527∗∗
(0.120) (0.000) (0.000)
10/2002–10/2003 1,360 29 1.71% 2.13% 0.924 0.939 0.378 0.681 1.059
(0.539) (0.409) (0.589)
10/2003–10/2004 1,551 14 1.53% 0.90% 0.919 0.904 0.282 0.296 0.577
(0.596) (0.587) (0.749)
10/2004–10/2005 1,653 15 1.33% 0.91% 0.912 0.923 0.101 0.148 0.250
(0.751) (0.700) (0.883)
10/2005–10/2006 1,666 6 1.32% 0.36% 0.913 0.897 3.536 0.120 3.656
(0.060) (0.729) (0.161)
10/2006–10/2007 1,724 6 1.44% 0.35% 0.910 0.984 4.945∗ 2.734 7.679∗
(0.026) (0.098) (0.022)
10/2007–10/2008 1,642 15 1.57% 0.91% 0.904 0.915 0.299 0.167 0.466
(0.584) (0.683) (0.792)
10/2008–10/2009 1,619 52 1.58% 3.21% 0.906 0.931 2.129 2.844 4.973
(0.145) (0.092) (0.083)
10/2009–10/2010 1,518 19 2.02% 1.25% 0.908 0.973 0.206 7.396∗∗ 7.602∗
(0.650) (0.007) (0.022)
10/2010–10/2011 1,471 8 1.64% 0.54% 0.901 0.967 2.123 3.061 5.184
(0.145) (0.080) (0.075)
10/2000–10/2011 16,727 254 1.57% 1.52% 0.912 0.918 19.141 30.571∗∗ 49.711∗∗
(0.059) (0.001) (0.001)
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